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1 Introduction
Understanding the relationship between economic and natural systems is of central impor-
tance, especially in developing countries given the role that agriculture plays for the economic
lives of the poor. One relationship that has received particular attention in recent years is
the relationship between weather and economic activity. However, less is known about how
economic agents respond to weather, and the degree to which behavioral responses moder-
ate the economic consequences of weather. One important margin is the degree to which
agricultural workers are able to manage weather-driven changes in labor demand. Are work-
ers able to find work in other sectors or locations, or do labor market frictions impede this
reallocation, inextricably coupling the livelihoods and welfare of these workers to changes in
the natural environment?
I seek to answer this question by combining worker-, firm- and district-level data with
high-resolution meteorological data in India, exploring the effects of weather on agricultural
productivity, industrial production and local labor market outcomes. First, and unsurpris-
ingly, I identify that increases in temperature are associated with a reduction in agricultural
production, and in turn the employment and wages of agricultural workers, demonstrating
the important role that weather plays in driving short-run agricultural productivity, and
the livelihoods of agricultural workers (Deaton, 1992, Paxson, 1992, Rosenzweig and Bin-
swanger, 1993, Townsend, 1994, Jayachandran, 2006, Guiteras, 2009, Taraz, 2012, Kaur,
2014, Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2014, Kala, 2015).
Having observed the negative effects of temperature increases on agricultural outcomes,
it is important to understand what happens to workers in response to these changes. While
I find that weather is a strong driver of short-run agricultural productivity, I observe that
it has no effect on agricultural prices, consistent with a “law of one price”, suggesting that
reductions in agricultural productivity should push workers out of agriculture and into other
tradable sectors of the economy (Burgess and Donaldson, 2010, 2012, Donaldson, 2015b);
however, this depends on the ability of workers to move across sectors, and on the ability of
other sectors to absorb these workers in response to short-run productivity shocks. Having
shown that increases in temperature result in a reduction in the employment share of agri-
culture, I estimate a corresponding shift of labor into the manufacturing sector. In addition,
I estimate that there are no changes in unemployment, or in the local population through
migration, bounding local labor markets and suggesting that the main margin through which
labor reallocation in India occurs is sectoral rather than spatial. These results suggest that
the ability of non-agricultural sectors to absorb workers within local labor markets may play
a key role in managing the economic consequences of weather-driven changes in agricul-
2
tural productivity, highlighting the importance of market integration and diversification can
play in attenuating sectoral productivity shocks (Matsuyama, 1992, Foster and Rosenzweig,
2004, Jayachandran, 2006, Burgess and Donaldson, 2010, 2012, Autor et al., 2013, Bustos
et al., 2015, Costinot et al., 2015, Donaldson, 2015a,b, Henderson et al., 2015, Hornbeck and
Keskin, 2015, Hornbeck and Moretti, 2015, Mian and Sufi, 2015).
Having demonstrated that other sectors of the economy are major absorbers of labor in
the face of weather-driven changes in agricultural productivity, it is of interest to understand
what these workers do, and how they affect firm and incumbent worker outcomes when they
move into the manufacturing sector. However, identifying these effects presents a number of
empirical challenges. To interpret the effects of weather on manufacturing outcomes as being
driven by labor reallocation, it is necessary that these outcomes are not affected by weather in
any other way. This is a strong assumption, as there are potentially many channels through
which weather could affect other sectors, directly and/or through agricultural linkages.1
Consequently, any estimate of the relationship between weather and manufacturing outcomes
will provide the net effect of all the competing and complementary channels involved. Given
this ambiguity, it is difficult to interpret empirical estimates of weather in a meaningful
way. Where empirically relevant channels move in the same direction, we fail to arrive at a
meaningful economic interpretation. Where multiple channels are competing, specific effects
may be missed entirely, or selected interpretations underestimated.
To try and address this concern, I exploit variation in the propensity of firms to absorb
labor in response to transitory changes in labor demand, arising from year-to-year changes
in the weather, helping to identify the channel of interest – the labor reallocation effect.
To do this, I construct a firm-level measure of exposure to India’s labor regulation envi-
ronment that builds on Besley and Burgess (2004), who classify the rigidity of the labor
1Changes in agricultural productivity could affect manufacturing outcomes in sectors that use agricultural
products as inputs, propagating shocks through intermediaries (Acemoglu et al., 2012), and a reduction
in agricultural income could reduce the consumption base for manufactured products with local demand
(Soderbom and Rijkers, 2013, Henderson et al., 2012, Santangelo, 2015, Emerick, 2016). Weather may
also affect manufacturing production directly through its impact on factors of production. For example,
an increase in temperature may reduce production through a reduction in the health or physical/cognitive
ability of workers and managers, through an increase in absenteeism due to avoidance behaviour (Mackworth,
1946, 1947, Kenrick and McFarlane, 1986, Hsiang, 2010, Cachon et al., 2012, Adhvaryu et al., 2015, Burgess
et al., 2014, Somonathan et al., 2015, Heal and Park, 2014, Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014, Graff Zivin et al.,
2015). Heavy rainfall may affect workers’ ability to get to work (Bandiera et al., 2015b), disrupt supply
chains. In addition, increased temperature, or a reduction in rainfall in areas dependent on hydroelectric
power generation, is likely to put additional stress on an already fragile electricity infrastructure, reducing
the supply of electrical power (Ryan, 2014, Alcott et al., 2015). Increases in temperature or reductions in
rainfall may increase groundwater use, resulting in competition for water between agriculture and industry
(Keskin, 2010). Finally, capital stocks and flows may be affected if weather affects capital depreciation, the
relative productivity of inputs, or the level of investment in the economy if capital is locally constrained
(Jina and Hsiang, 2015, Asher and Novosad, 2014).
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market environment using state-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947
(hereafter IDA). In rigid labor market environments, firms face significant hiring and firing
costs that, I argue, diminish the incentive to hire workers in response to transitory changes
in the availability of labor (Oi, 1962, Nickell, 1978, Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Hamermesh,
1993, Heckman, 2003, Besley and Burgess, 2004, Haltiwanger et al., 2008, Ahsan and Page´s,
2009, Adhvaryu et al., 2013, Amirapu and Gechter, 2014, Chaurey, 2015). By contrast,
these costs are supposedly lower in more flexible labor market environments, where firms
have more bargaining power over hiring decisions. However, this alone is not sufficient to
identify the effects of labor reallocation. There may be other differences across space that
could conflate the estimated effects of weather on manufacturing outcomes based on these
differences. Consequently, I introduce firm-level exposure to the labor regulation environ-
ment, based on chapter 5b of the Industrial Disputes Act, which specifies the size that firms
can reach before they are regulated under the IDA. In support of this identification strategy,
I observe bunching in the firm-size distribution to the left of the regulatory threshold in rigid
labor market environments, but not in the case of the flexible labor market environments,
suggesting that the IDA has a binding effect on firm behavior.
For the identification strategy to have any viability the other effects of weather must
not have a differential effect across across labor regulation environments. To test this I first
examine the effects of temperature on unregulated firms. This provides a direct test for the
assumption that the other channels of weather are not differential across labor regulation
environments. In support of this assumption I estimate that there are limited differential
effects of temperature on unregulated firms across labor regulation environments. While it
would be a overtly strong to claim the absence of confounding factors, this suggests that, at a
minimum, the net effect of other policy variation, heterogeneous weather effects and general
equilibrium considerations cancel each other out across labor regulation environments. Fur-
ther support for this premise is found by exploring the differential effects of temperature on
unregulated sectors across labor regulation environments, where again I find limited evidence
of spatial differences. Consequently, to the extent that these factors do exist, empirically
they are likely to have a limited impact on the identification of the labor reallocation effect
in regulated firms. Only confounding differences across labor regulation environments that
differentially affect regulated firms, but not unregulated firms, will affect identification of
the labor reallocation effect.
With this in mind, I next examine the effects of temperature on regulated firms. I esti-
mate that, in rigid labor market environments, an increase in temperature is associated with
a negative impact on firm performance, consistent with – but not limited to – an emerging
literature that suggests that increases in temperature have significant effects on labor produc-
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tivity through a drag on physiological and cognitive ability (Mackworth, 1946, 1947, Kenrick
and McFarlane, 1986, Hsiang, 2010, Cachon et al., 2012, Adhvaryu et al., 2015, Somonathan
et al., 2015, Heal and Park, 2014, Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014, Graff Zivin et al., 2015).
However, in flexible labor market environments, I estimate that firms experience a relative
increase in employment and output, with new entrants moving into casual manufacturing
activities. This expansion offsets the adverse effects of temperature. These effects provide
support for the premise that firms in flexible labor market environments are more able to
absorb workers in response to agricultural productivity shocks. In addition I estimate a rel-
ative increase in the average wage of permanent workers, manufacturing productivity (TFP
and output per worker), and the number of items that the firm produces, suggesting that the
activities that casual and permanent workers engage in are complementary to production.
The absence of movement into permanent positions suggests that labor markets can be
characterised, at least in the short run, as dualistic: workers earn different wages depending
on the type of employment activities in which they engage (casual vs. permanent).2 These
results are consistent with an emerging literature that explores the impact of agricultural
productivity shocks on local economic activity (Hornbeck, 2012, Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014,
Bustos et al., 2015, Henderson et al., 2015, Hornbeck and Keskin, 2015, Marden, 2015).
However, most of the research to date has focused on long-run changes in agricultural pro-
ductivity due to permanent changes in technology or the environment. By focusing on
short-run changes in the weather, it is plausible that other factors of production, such as
capital or the allocation of land, are held constant, allowing me to identify the effects of
labor reallocation on manufacturing outcomes rather than any collective change in factors
of production. In support of this premise, I find that increases in temperature have no effect
on capital, management, or the entry of new plants.
These results suggest that the reallocation of labor across sectors could play an important
role in attenuating the economic consequences of agricultural productivity shocks. Counter-
factual estimates, examining the impact of temperature on total GDP, suggest that in the
absence of labor reallocation total economic losses would be up to 40% larger. This high-
lights the role that liberalising goods and labor markets can play, as well as the importance
of the local policy environment, in managing the economic consequences of weather-driven
changes in agricultural productivity. In addition, I estimate that mitigating the adverse
effects of temperature on manufacturing could offset the aggregate effects of temperature by
up to 72% in the absence of any adaptation in the agricultural sector, suggesting that there
2Understanding whether the differences between casual and manufacturing workers in the manufacturing
sector are driven by frictions or human capital differences is beyond the scope and capacity of the data and
so remains an important question for future research.
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could be considerable gains associated with managing the adverse effects of temperature in
non-agricultural sectors. Collectively, these results provide insights into an important mech-
anism through which economic agents are able to manage climatic influence on economic
outcomes, as well as highlighting the sensitivity of non-agricultural sectors to temperature
increases.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 examines the relation-
ship between weather and agricultural production; section 3 investigates the degree to which
workers are able to move across sectors and space in response to weather-induced labor de-
mand shocks; section 4 explores the impact of labor reallocation on manufacturing outcomes;
section 5 discusses the implications of these results, considering the degree to which labor
reallocation across sectors could offset losses to agriculture; section 6 concludes.
2 The Effects of Weather on Agricultural Markets
As in many developing countries, agriculture plays an important role in India’s economy.
During the time period of this study – the beginning of the 21st century –, agriculture
accounted for roughly 15–20% of GDP, 60–70% of land use, and 40-50% of employment –
many of whom are landless laborers employed on daily contracts.
A key feature of India’s agricultural landscape is its dependence on the timing and inten-
sity of the monsoon (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993).3 Rainfall plays an important and
salient role in the production of crops; however, the role of temperature, is a consideration
often neglected in economic analysis. The monsoon’s arrival in early summer is especially
important for the kharif season, which corresponds with this period, but also for the rabi
season, which begins at the end of the kharif season and continues through the cooler autumn
and winter months before being harvested in the spring. Consequently, rabi yields are highly
dependent on the degree to which rainfall can be stored in the soil. High temperatures prior
to the monsoon affect the onset of the monsoon – a thermally driven phenomenon –, the
degree to which rainfall drains from the soil, and soil temperature, which is important for
seed germination and plant growth. High temperatures during the monsoon directly affect
the kharif crop and increase the rate of evapotranspiration, which affects the availability of
moisture in the soil, necessary for rabi crop production. Finally, high temperatures directly
affect the rabi crop, even in the case in which irrigation is used.4
3During the period of study less than 30% of cultivated land is irrigated.
4While temperature is an important determinant of vapour pressure deficit, which irrigation can alleviate,
around one third of the effects of temperature on yield losses arise due to an increase in the pace of crop
development, which provides less time for the plant to develop and absorb nutrients and calories (Schlenker
and Roberts, 2009). Fishman (2012) demonstrates these effects in the context of India by showing that
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In this section I examine the effects of weather on two sets of agricultural outcomes. First,
I examine the degree to which weather affects agricultural production in India, identifying
the sign and magnitude of this relationship. Second, I examine the effects of weather on
agricultural prices. This provides an insight into the expected response of labor following
a change in agricultural productivity. A priori, it is ambiguous as to whether a reduction
in agricultural productivity will result in an increase or decrease in the demand for labor.
In a state of autarky, a reduction in agricultural production will result in an increase in
prices as supply falls. Jayachandran (2006) shows that if workers have an inelastic labor
supply and face a binding subsistence constraint for food (only relevant in the absence of
trade), then a reduction in agricultural production will result in an increase in agricultural
labor. Furthermore, an increase in prices could reduce the consumption base of the local
economy, reducing demand for other commodities (Henderson et al., 2012, Soderbom and
Rijkers, 2013, Santangelo, 2015, Emerick, 2016). By contrast, if the local economy is open
to trade, then consumption and production are separable. In a state of autarky, agricultural
surplus is necessary for the movement of workers into non-agricultural production, as the
local economy is responsible for feeding itself. Only when enough food is produced can the
economy focus on producing other products. However, when an economy is open to trade,
the local economy does not need to produce food itself. Food can be imported and paid
for by the export revenues of other commodities. Consequently, instead of rural prosperity
fuelling the movement of workers out of agriculture – the historical norm for many developed
countries –, rural deprivation pushes workers out of agriculture into other sectors of the
economy. In the case of free trade, prices in the local economy are exogenous, set on the
global market. Consequently, a local change in production will have a more muted affect
on the price of tradable products if the locality is more open to trade, resulting in a change
in local comparative advantage. Appendix A presents a simple model based on Matsuyama
(1992) demonstrating how the comparative statics vary based on market integration. By
understanding the responsiveness of prices to changes in the weather, we can gain an insight
into the degree to which Indian districts are integrated into other markets, either national
or international, allowing us to postulate the direction in which labor might move following
a change in agricultural productivity. Section 3 will then test these insights directly using
worker-level data on employment and wages.
higher temperatures still have a direct effect on rice yields – a crop known to be naturally resistant to higher
temperatures – after controlling for irrigation.
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2.1 Data – Yields and Prices
Data on crop yields and farm-gate prices come from the ICRISAT Village Dynamics in
South Asia Macro-Meso Database (henceforth VDSA), which is a compiled from a number
of official government data sources. The data analysed cover 12 major crops across 302
districts in 19 states between 1960 and 2009.5 For comparability with the other datasets I
restrict my attention to the period 2001–2007. For each crop and district, the data provide
the total area planted, total production in tonnes, and farm-gate prices. It is straightforward
to calculate yields as total production divided by total area planted. I also calculate the value
of production, defined as price multiplied by yield. Prices, by crop, are deflated to 2001 Rs.
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the VDSA data.
2.2 Data – Rainfall and Temperature
Rainfall and temperature data are collected from the ERA-Interim Reanalysis archive, which
provides 6-hourly atmospheric variables for the period on a 0.25◦ × 0.25◦ quadrilateral grid.
Daily variables are calculated for each district centroid using inverse distance weighting
from all grid points within 100km. The weight attributed to each grid point decreases
quadratically with distance.6 Although India has a large system of weather stations that
provide daily readings dating back to the 19th century, the spatial and temporal coverage of
ground stations that report temperature and rainfall readings has sharply deteriorated over
time. Furthermore, there are many missing values in the publicly available series. If we were
to base the construction of this data on a selection rule that requires data for 365 days of the
year, the database would have very few observations. Reanalysis data provides a solution
to these issues and to endogeneity concerns related to the placement of weather stations,
variation in the quality of data collection, and variation in the quantity of data collected. By
combining observational data, from ground stations and remote-sensing products (satellites),
with global climate models, reanalysis data provides a consistent best estimate of atmospheric
parameters over time and space (Auffhammer et al., 2013). This results in an estimate of the
climate system that is separated uniformly across a grid, that is more uniform in quality and
realism that observations alone, and that is closer to the state of existence than any model
could provide alone. This type of dataset is increasingly being used by economists, especially
5The 12 crops are Barley, Cotton, Finger Millet, Groundnut, Linseed, Maize, Pearl Millet, Rice, Rape
and Mustard Seed, Sorghum, Sugarcane, and Wheat.
6The results are robust to alternative methods of construction, including: linear weights; cubic weights;
the simple average of each point in the district; the average of each point in the district weighted by the
area share of cultivated land; and the average of each point in the district weighted by population. Measures
based on averages result in a smaller sample size, as some districts do not contain a data point and require
the inverse distance weighting procedure.
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in developing countries, where the quality and quantity of weather data is limited.7 Panel
D of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the ERA-Interim Reanalysis Data.8
2.3 Empirical Specification – Yields and Prices
The unit of observation in this analysis is the crop × district level.9 In 2001, the average
district population was 1.75 million and the average area was 5,462 km2 (Census of India,
2001).10 The main empirical specification for estimating the effect of weather on agricultural
outcomes is based on the following model,
log Ycdt = f(wdt) + αcd + αct + φst+ εcdt
where: Ycdt represents the outcome of interest – yields, the value of production, or farm-
gate prices; αcd is a vector of crop × district fixed effects; and αct is a vector of crop × year
fixed effects, absorbing all unobserved time-varying differences in the dependent variable
that are common across districts. However, the assumption that shocks or time-varying
factors are common across districts is unlikely to be valid, so I also include a set of flexible,
state-specific time trends, φst.
The last term is the stochastic error term, εcdt. I follow the approach of Hsiang (2010) by
assuming that the error term εdt is heteroskedastic and serially correlated within a district
over time (Newey and West, 1987) and spatially correlated across contemporaneous districts
(Conley, 1999). For each result I loop over all possible distances up to 2000km, selecting the
parameter value that maximises the standard errors. I then repeat this exercise for serial
correlation, consistently resulting in a kernel of 1 year.11
f(wdt) is a function of rainfall and temperature. In the most basic specification, f(wdt)
is modelled as a function of daily average temperature and total rainfall:
7All results are broadly robust to the use of alternative rainfall and temperature datasets from both
satellite (TRMM) and ground station (UDEL) sources.
8Further details on all data sources are available in appendix B.
9Results are robust to aggregating across crops, using 2001 area weights, or to using the main crop in
each district, defined using area planted in 2001.
10This is roughly twice the average area of a U.S. county (2,585 km2) and nearly 18 times greater than
the average population of a U.S. county (100,000). When compared to commuting zones and labor market
areas in the U.S. – developed because county boundaries are not considered adequate confines for an area’s
local economy and labor market –, Indian districts are approximately 4 times the population size (401,932)
and around half the area (11,396 km2).
11Results are also robust when standard errors are clustered at the state level. Fisher et al. (2012)
report that clustering at the state level in the U.S. provides equivalent results to directly accounting for
spatial correlation using the Conley (1999) standard error adjustment. The average state size in India, when
compared to the United States, is roughly similar when compared to states east of the 100th meridian, the
historic boundary between (primarily) irrigated and (primarily) rainfed agriculture in the United States.
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f(wdt) = β1(Temperaturedt) + β2(Rainfalldt)
As discussed, temperature is important for agricultural production both during and out-
side of the monsoon period. Consequently, I use crop calendars to define the relevant time
period over which to construct the temperature variables. Alternative specifications, ac-
counting for non-linearities in the temperature schedule are presented in Appendix E. Total
rainfall is calculated for each state’s monsoon period, beginning with the first month in
which total monthly rainfall exceeds 100mm and ending with the first month that rainfall
falls below 100mm.
2.4 Results – Yields and Prices
In Table 2 I estimate that a 1◦C increase in temperature is associated with a 12.7% reduction
in yield (column 1) and a 12.6% reduction in the value of production (column 2). In addition,
a 100mm increase in rainfall is associated with a 1.15% increase in yield and a 1.07% increase
in the value of production.
It is interesting to note that, in terms of its relative contribution, a one standard devia-
tion change in temperature is shown to have a much larger effect on production (4.39%/SD)
when compared to a one standard deviation change in rainfall (2.05%/SD), highlighting the
important role that temperature plays in Indian agriculture.12 This suggests that the impor-
tance attributed to rainfall for agricultural production in India may have been overestimated
by the omission of temperature in previous work. Alternatively, it may have been the case
that over time, farmers have become more effective in managing the effects of rainfall shocks,
given the salient nature of the monsoon. This may also be due to the fact that rainfall is
storable and can be substituted with ground water resources (manually, or through the use of
irrigation systems), whereas the effects of temperature are more difficult to address, requir-
ing heat-resistant crop varieties. The use of irrigation has been shown to offset the adverse
effects of rainfall shortages; however, high temperatures still have a direct effect on yields
even in the presence of irrigation (Fishman, 2012).
To consider the consequences of agricultural productivity shocks on labor demand, it
is also of interest to understand the degree to which weather affects agricultural prices.
In column 3 we observe that, on average, neither temperature or rainfall has a significant
statistical or economic effect on agricultural prices.13 This suggests that Indian districts
12These results are robust across weather data sets and over an extended period of analysis dating back
to the 1960s.
13Allen and Atkin (2015) find a similar result looking at the effects of market access on agricultural prices
in India between 1960 and 2010.
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are reasonably well integrated with other markets, and can be considered as small, open
economies. Consequently, a reduction in agricultural production should be associated with a
reduction in the demand for agricultural labor, resulting in an outflow of workers into other
tradable sectors of the economy due to a change in local comparative advantage. The next
section formally tests this hypothesis.
3 The Effects of Weather on Employment, Wages and
Migration
Given the significance of weather as a driver of short-run agricultural productivity, it is of
interest to understand how these effects feed into labor market outcomes, providing insights
into the consequences of weather shocks on the economic lives of agricultural workers. In this
section I examine the effects of weather on wages, employment and unemployment within
districts. In addition I explore the effects of weather on migration, examining the degree to
which weather shocks in other districts affect employment outcomes in destination districts.
This exercise provides insights into the relative importance of labor movements across vs.
within districts in response to changes in agricultural productivity, as well as helping to
bound local labor markets in India.
3.1 Data – Wages and Employment
Data on wages, employment and migration come from the National Sample Survey Organi-
sation (hereafter, the NSS employment survey). The NSS employment survey is a nationally
representative household survey which collects information on employment and wages in
rural and urban areas. For the purpose of this analysis I make use of NSS survey rounds
60, 61, 62 and 64, covering 2003–04, 2004–05, 2005–06, and 2007–08. The level of anal-
ysis using the NSS data is at the district level. I restrict my attention to the sample of
districts used in the analysis of agricultural yields, covering both rural and urban areas. I
calculate the average day wage and the likelihood of being employed in each sector. The
analysis focusses on four sectors, broadly defined as agriculture, manufacturing, services,
and construction. The average daily wage is defined as the total wage received divided by
the number of days worked over the previous seven days. The likelihood of being employed
in each of the aggregated sector in a given district-year is calculated from individual re-
sponses to a survey question on their principal sector of engagement or whether they are
unemployed, and provides district-level labor force employment share. Panel B of Table 1
provides summary statistics for wages and Panel C provides summary statistics for employ-
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ment and unemployment shares. Agriculture accounts for an average of 44% of the labor
force, with manufacturing employing 23%, services 18%, and construction 6%. Unemploy-
ment is is 8% of the labor force.14 Examining the differences in wages across sectors, we
observe that the wage that agricultural laborers receive on average is significantly lower than
the non-agricultural wage. Whether this unconditional wage gap is driven by adjustment
costs, human capital differences, compensating differentials associated with sector-specific
amenities, or bargaining power, is unclear; however, examining the degree to which workers
are able to move across sectors in response to short-run productivity shocks provides some
insight into the degree to which adjustment costs may be a first-order concern in this context.
3.2 Data – Migration
An important consideration is the degree to which workers may move across space, rather
than sectors. Round 64 of the NSS Employment Survey contains a special schedule on
seasonal migration. This provides data on the origin district of seasonal migrants; however,
there is no detail on the destination of seasonal migrants. Instead, the NSS reports the
destination of migrants in District `o in six relevant categories: rural or urban migration
within the same District (moo); rural or urban migration between Districts in the same
State (
∑
`d 6=`o∈Somod); rural or urban migration between States (
∑
Sd 6=So
∑
`d 6=`o∈Sdmod).
Consequently, it is necessary to predict the district of destination for seasonal migrants who
migrate to different districts. To do this, I draw inspiration from Imbert and Papp (2015)
and use the 2001 Indian Population Census, extracting data on migrant workers by state of
last residence. For each destination district, `d, I observe: the number of migrant workers
from the same district (Mdd); the number of migrant workers from other districts in the
same state (
∑
`o 6=`d∈SdMdo); the number of migrant workers from districts in other states
(
∑
So 6=Sd
∑
`o 6=`d∈SoMdo). I combine these data to estimate seasonal migration flows mˆod,
using the following algorithm:
mˆod =

mod if `o = `d
∑
`o 6=`d∈SdMdo∑
Sd
∑
`o 6=`d∈SdMdo
∑
`d 6=`o∈Somod if `o 6= `d and So = Sd
∑
So 6=Sd
∑
`o 6=`d∈SoMdo∑
Sd
∑
So 6=Sd
∑
`o 6=`d∈SoMdo
∑
Sd 6=So
∑
`d 6=`o∈Sdmod if `o 6= `d and So 6= Sd
14Unfortunately, it is not possible to explore entry and exit from the labor force.
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I deviate from Imbert and Papp (2015) in two respects. First, by using migrant workers
rather than the total population of permanent migrants. Second, by broadening my attention
beyond urban destinations. Non-agricultural production is not restricted to urban areas,
and so rural–urban migration is not the appropriate characterisation of migration flows in
the context of this paper. Indeed, a number of papers provide evidence to suggest that
non-agricultural production in India is decentralising, from urban to peri-urban and even
rural areas, taking advantage of cheaper labor and vastly cheaper land prices (Ghani et al.,
2012, Desmet et al., 2015, Colmer, 2015). These adjustments provide stronger support for
the identification assumption, on which this approach relies: that the proportion of NSS
seasonal migrants who go from district `o to district `d, either in the same state or between
states, is the same as the proportion of census migrant workers in district `d who come from
another district `o, either in the same state or between states.
On average, rural-origin migrants comprise the bulk of migration flows, accounting for
nearly 90% of all seasonal migration. 66.1% of migrants move within the same district,
2.6% of migrants move to another district within the same state (shared among an average
of 15 districts per state, 0.17% per district), and 31.3% move to a different district in a
different state (shared among an average of 577 districts, 0.05% per district).15 However,
most strikingly, we observe that there is very little seasonal migration in absolute terms – only
1.1% of the population engage in seasonal migration. This is an observation that has been
highlighted by a number of papers and contrasts starkly with migration patterns in other
developing and developed countries (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2008, Munshi and Rosenzweig,
2015, Morten, 2013).
These insights have potential implications for the effects of localised shocks in India. First,
if workers are limited in their ability to move across space, then the economic consequences
of agricultural productivity shocks will be locally concentrated. Second, this implies that
sectoral shocks are likely to have a bigger effect on other sectors in the local economy, as
employment adjustments are less diversified across space. Finally, this implies that localised
productivity shocks elsewhere are unlikely to have a large effect on economic outcomes across
space; however, the validity of this argument is decreasing as the spatial correlation of
localised productivity shocks increases, and as the importance of a specific location for the
supply of workers increases. I test this prediction by examining the effects of localised
temperature shocks in origin districts on employment and wages in destination districts
to understand the degree to which localised productivity shocks propagate through labor
markets across space.
15593 districts - 1 state, i.e., an average of 16 districts = 577 out-of-state districts on average
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3.3 Empirical Specification – Employment, Wages, and Migration
In analysing the effect of weather on employment, wages, and migration, the unit of analysis
is the district level. The main empirical specification for estimating the effect of weather on
local labor market outcomes is based on the following model,
Ydt = f(wdt) + αd + αt + φst+ εdt
where: Ydt represents the outcome of interest – sectoral labor force shares and the log
of average wages; αd is a vector of district fixed effects, absorbing all unobserved district-
specific time-invariant variation in the dependent variables; and αt is a vector of year fixed
effects, absorbing all unobserved time-varying differences in the dependent variable that are
common across districts. I also include a set of flexible, state-specific time trends, φst.
As in the analysis on agricultural outcomes, f(wdt) is a function of rainfall and tem-
perature. In the most basic specification, f(wdt) is modelled as a function of daily average
temperature measured over the agricultural year, and total rainfall measured over the state-
specific monsoon period. Alternative specifications, accounting for non-linearities in the
temperature schedule are presented in Appendix E.
The last term is the stochastic error term, εdt. Standard errors are adjusted as in section
2.3.
The specification examining the degree to which weather-driven changes in agricultural
productivity in “foreign” districts affect local labor market outcomes through migration
differs slightly.
Using the bilateral migration flows discussed in section I construct a spatial weights ma-
trix summarising the migratory relationship between each district. As mentioned, migration
flows between `o and `d produce and o× d matrix Mo×d,
Mo×d =

m11 m12 · · · m1D
m21 m22 · · · m2D
...
...
. . .
...
mD1 mD2 · · · mDD

Each weight mdo reflects the contribution of migration flows from district o to district
d. In the case that all migration is spread equally between all districts, each entry in Mo×d
will be equal to 1/d. At the other extreme, the case in which all migration occurs within
districts provides an identity matrix. Based on the data, migration patterns in India tend
towards the identity matrix extreme, far from an equal distribution of migrants.
To identify the degree to which local labor demand shocks affect economic outcomes
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in destination sectors, I weight temperature and rainfall variation by the bilateral migra-
tion matrix, examining the migration-weighted effects of weather in district o on economic
outcomes in district d through migration. The estimating equation is specified as follows,
Ydt = βf(wdt) + γ
[∑
o
mod
Md
× f(wot)
]
+ αd + αt + φst+ εdt
where: Ydt represents sectoral labor force shares in destination district d; αd is a vector
of district fixed effects; αt is a vector of year fixed effects; φst a set of state-specific time
trends.∑
o
mod
Md
× f(wot) captures the migration-weighted effects of weather in other districts.
By directly controlling for local weather effects, f(wdt), to account for the correlation of
weather across space, γ identifies the effects of weather variation in foreign districts on local
labor market outcomes through migration.
3.4 Results – Wages, Employment, and Migration
Table 3 presents the effects of temperature and rainfall on the average wage of workers in
each sector within the local economy. A priori, the effect of weather on the average wage is
ambiguous, as the overall effect depends on the change in composition of the workforce in
each sector as well as the direct effects of temperature and rainfall changes. If, for a given
level of demand, hot, dry weather reduces the supply of labor due to avoidance behavior then
the average wage will rise. If, for a given level of supply, hot dry weather reduces the demand
for labor there is less work available and so the average wage will fall. We observe that an
increase in the daily average temperature is associated with a reduction in the average day
wage for agricultural workers (5.16%/ 1◦C), consistent with a reduction in the demand for
agricultural labor. As discussed, this could well be a function of both supply and demand
forces, if workers are less willing to work in the heat, counteracting the reduction in the
average wage. However, it is clear that the demand effect dominates. While this acts as
an insurance mechanism for farm owners, a reduction in the average wage combined with a
reduction in the availability of work – on the intensive or the extensive margin – could have
significant welfare effects on agricultural workers if they are limited in their ability to find
other work.
Interestingly, we see that rainfall limited effects on the average day wage. The sign on
the estimated coefficient is negative and it is marginally significant. Furthermore, this effect
is driven by an increase in the denominator (days worked in agriculture) rather than any
change in the wage bill received. By contrast, temperature effects are driven by a reduction
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in the numerator, the wage bill. As discussed, rainfall is estimated to have less of an effect
on agricultural production and so the impact on agriculture may not be significant enough
to affect labor market outcomes. Associated with this consideration, it may simply be the
case that, due to the relatively short time-series, there is not enough power to identify these
effects.
In addition to the effects on agricultural wages, we observe that an increase in temperature
is associated with a reduction in the average day wage in manufacturing (3.4%/ 1◦C); however
this effect is not statistically significant. Again it is not clear as to how the average day wage
in manufacturing should respond. In a simple model of labor reallocation, the movement of
workers across sectors should reduce the average wage in the destination sectors. However,
this depends on how the inflow of workers affects the wages of the incumbent workers. In the
context of manufacturing where the tasks of workers is less uniform than in agriculture, there
may be complementarities between worker types, which could increase the average wage in
manufacturing. However, the limited movement in wages across other sectors, may simply
indicate that workers are not moving across sectors. To understand the degree to which
workers are moving, I estimate the effects of weather on employment and unemployment as
shares of the labor force, identifying the degree to which workers are able to move across
sectors, and find jobs, in response to reductions in the demand for agricultural labor.
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. We observe that an increase in the daily aver-
age temperature is associated with a significant reduction in the district share of agricultural
employment (11%/ 1◦C). Combined with the wage results, this indicates that temperature
increases are associated with significant reductions in the demand for agricultural labor. The
question remains as to whether these workers are able to find employment in other sectors
of the economy, or whether they become unemployed. Consistent with the inferences drawn
from the effects of weather on agricultural prices, we observe that the reduction in the share
of agricultural employment is offset by an increase in the share of manufacturing employment
(7.61%/1◦C) (and a smaller increase in the share of services employment (3.86%/1◦C)). Of
interest, we observe that there are no changes in unemployment, suggesting that workers
in India are relatively unconstrained in their ability to move across sectors in response to
transitory labor demand shocks.
Consistent with the premise that the effects of rainfall on agricultural production are not
sufficient to drive labor market outcomes, rainfall is shown to have no significant effect on
changes in the composition of employment in the local economy.16 This is consistent with
the previous results, demonstrating that temperature has a relatively more important effect
on agricultural production than rainfall – a premise that has found support in a number
16These results are robust across alternative weather data sets.
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of other recent studies, emphasising the importance of temperature variation over rainfall
as a driver of economic outcomes (Hsiang, 2010, Dell et al., 2012, Gray and Mueller, 2012,
Burgess et al., 2014, Mueller et al., 2014, Burke et al., 2015).
In addition to looking at the effects of weather on local economic activity, I also examine
the degree to which weather may affect labor market outcomes through migration. The
purpose of this exercise is to examine whether short-run changes in the weather result in
a reallocation of labor across space, distorting the definition of the local labor market and,
consequently, the interpretation of the results, as well as being an outcome of interest in
its own right. In particular, it is important to understand the degree to which changes
in the population may distort changes in labor force shares. If increases in temperature
results in out flows of workers then this would mechanically increase the employment share
in the manufacturing and services sector. However, this would also mechanically increase
the unemployment rate, even if there were no changes in unemployment.
Table 5 presents the results of this exercise. I find that the migration-weighted weather
effects have no effect on employment shares in destination markets, indicating that there
is little migration across districts in response to temperature increases. Consequently, local
labor markets in India can be bounded at the district level. The reason behind the limited
migration remains unclear: on the one hand workers may face significant adjustment costs
across space; on the other hand, the ability of other sectors to absorb workers in response to
sectoral productivity shocks somewhat mitigates the need to move across space.
Collectively, the results presented in this section suggest that workers in India are rela-
tively able to move across sectors in response to transitory labor demand shocks, suggesting
limited constraints on the supply-side. Furthermore, there appear to be limited demand-side
constraints in response to these transitory labor demand shocks, with the manufacturing
sector absorbing a significant share of these workers.
4 The Effects of Weather on Manufacturing
Having provided evidence to suggest that agricultural workers are relatively able to move
across sectors in response to weather-induced changes in agricultural productivity and that
the manufacturing sector is a major absorber of these workers, it is of interest to understand
what these workers do and how they affect the productivity of firms and the labor market
outcomes of incumbent workers. In turn these insights will help to shed light on the degree to
which labor reallocation can attenuate the economic consequences of temperature increases.
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4.1 Data – Manufacturing Plants
Data on manufacturing come from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) collected by the
Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MoSPI), Government of India. The
ASI covers all registered industrial units that employ 10 or more workers and use electricity,
or employ at least 20 workers and do not use electricity. The ASI frame is divided into
two schedules: the census schedule, which is surveyed every year, and the sample schedule,
which is randomly sampled every few years. The ASI has a much wider coverage than other
datasets, such as the Census of Manufacturing Industries (CMI) and the Sample Survey of
Manufacturing Industries (SSMI), and is comparable to manufacturing surveys in the United
States and other industrialised countries. However, the ASI does not cover informal industry
that falls outside the Factories Act of 1948. The formal sector accounts for approximately
two-thirds of manufacturing output in India and is therefore not representative of all manu-
facturing activities. It is, however, representative of tradable manufacturing in India, since
the informal sector trades very small volumes, if at all. Consistent with this premise Santan-
gelo (2015) finds that there are no movements of workers into the informal manufacturing
sector following rainfall-driven changes in agricultural productivity. Appendix B provides
more details on the ASI data preparation. The sample used cover an average of 14,876 firms
observed between 2001 and 2007, resulting in a total of 103,273 firm-year observations.
The outcomes of interest are the log of total output, employment, and the average day
wage (defined as the total wage bill/the total number of man days worked during the year).
Employment outcomes are examined for both permanent (non-managerial) workers and con-
tract workers. The distinction between contract workers and permanent workers is important
for this analysis, especially for regulated firms.17 Contract workers are on casual contracts
and so a priori are the type of worker that one would expect to move between the agricultural
and manufacturing sector.
Using worker-level data from the NSS (discussed in section 3), I estimate worker-level
mincerian wage regressions to estimate the size of wage gaps after controlling for educa-
tion, age, gender, district and year fixed effects. Table 6 shows that there is a significant
wage gap between permanent manufacturing workers and agricultural workers, with per-
manent manufacturing workers earning 1.54 times more than agricultural workers, within
local labor markets after controlling for individual characteristics.18 However, we observe
that the average wage gap between casual manufacturing workers and agricultural workers
17The distinction between contract and permanent workers is less clear for unregulated firms. However,
within unregulated firms we observe that contract workers earn less than permanent workers and so may be
characterized as less skilled, or in more temporary/casual positions.
18This data does not make the distinction between the informal and formal sector.
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almost disappears after controlling for individual characteristics, with casual manufacturing
workers earning 9% more than agricultural workers. Consequently, there is greater common
support between the wages of contract workers and agricultural workers, indicating that
within low-skill groups workers are relatively substitutable across sectors. This suggests
that labor markets in this context may not be dualistic across sectors per se (agriculture
vs. non-agriculture), but rather can be characterised as dualistic across types of activities or
skill. The fact that non-agricultural sectors contain workers that are more likely to engage
in more skilled or productive activities conflates the interpretation of a dualistic labor mar-
ket across sectors. However, a sectoral dimension may become more important as workers
rise up the skill ladder and work in more specialized tasks, reducing the substitutability of
workers across sectors.
In addition to the outcome variables described above, I construct two measures of pro-
ductivity. The first is a simple measure: output per worker. While this is a crude measure of
productivity, it provides a relatively useful measure of the average labor productivity of the
firm. The second measure is an estimate of total factor productivity. Appendix B provides
an explicit model of TFP, in the context of a profit-maximising firm, that I use to construct
my empirical estimates.
4.2 The Labor Regulation Environment in India
The combination of manufacturing firm-level data with meteorological data provides the
basis of this empirical analysis. However, this is not sufficient to identify how the movement
of labor out of agriculture affects economic outcomes in the manufacturing sector. The key
empirical challenge relates to the fact that, while exogenous changes in temperature are an
important driver of short-run agricultural productivity, there are potentially many empir-
ically relevant channels through which temperature could affect manufacturing outcomes.
Consequently, any estimate of the reduced form estimate of temperature on the outcomes of
interest will provide the net effect of all empirically relevant channels.
To try to address this challenge, I set out to identify the labor reallocation channel, net
of the remaining empirically relevant channels, by exploiting variation in the propensity of
firms to absorb workers in response to transitory weather shocks. To do this, I exploit a
combination of spatial variation and firm-level exposure to India’s labor regulation environ-
ment. In more flexible labor market environments, regulated firms should be relatively more
able to absorb workers in response to transitory changes in labor demand, compared to firms
in rigid labor market environments. Unregulated firms should not be directly affected by
the regulation, and so there should be no differential effects of temperature on unregulated
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firms across labor regulation environments.19
Industrial regulation in India has largely been the result of central planning; however, the
area of industrial relations is an exception to this, providing spatial variation in firms’ incen-
tives regarding the hiring and firing of workers following transitory changes in labor demand.
The key piece of legislation used to measure state-level variation in sectoral mobility is the
Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 (hereafter the IDA). The IDA regulates Indian Labor Law
concerning trade unions, setting out conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication procedures
to be followed in the case of an industrial dispute, and was designed to offer workers in the
formal manufacturing sector protection against exploitation by employers. Up until the mid
1990s, the IDA was extensively amended at the state level, resulting in spatial variation in
labor market rigidities. Besley and Burgess (2004) use these extensive state-level amend-
ments (113 in total) to construct a measure of the labor regulation, environment studying its
impact on manufacturing performance and urban poverty. By examining the amendments
made in each state over time, states are coded as either neutral, pro-worker, or pro-employer.
A pro-worker amendment is classified as one that decreases a firm’s flexibility in the hiring
and firing of workers; Pro-employer amendments are classified as increasing a firm’s flexibil-
ity in hiring and firing. Importantly, one may be concerned that agricultural volatility or
weather may have been correlated with the timing or the direction of amendments; however,
fortunately I provide evidence to suggest that this isn’t the case (see Appendix D).
The cumulation of these scores over time determines the state’s labor regulation envi-
ronment. Consequently, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Orissa are assigned as pro-worker
states (rigid). Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh are assigned
as pro-employer states (flexible). The remaining states are assigned as neutral. This assign-
ment captures spatial variation in the propensity of firms to take advantage of transitory
labor supply changes arising from year-to-year changes in agricultural productivity.
However, state-level variation is not sufficient to identify the labor reallocation channel,
as it may simply capture the heterogeneous effects of weather, general equilibrium effects,
or other state-level variation, confounding the interpretation of the estimated coefficients.20
I therefore combine this spatial variation with firm-level exposure to the regulation based
on chapter 5b of the IDA, which specifies the size that firms can become before the IDA
has a binding effect. The firm-size threshold is 50 in West Bengal, 300 in Uttar Pradesh,
and 100 elsewhere.21 Consistent with these rule I demonstrate that that there is evidence
19In theory, unregulated firms may be affected indirectly through spillovers. For example, in rigid labor
market environments there may be relatively increase in employment at unregulated firms, due to the limited
labor market opportunities in the regulated sector.
20Although, importantly there does not appear to be any common differential effect of temperature on
non-manufacturing sectors across labor regulation environments (see Appendix D).
21Results are robust to applying a uniform threshold across all states away from the regulated threshold,
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of bunching in the raw data just below the firm-size employment threshold for rigid labor
market environments, but not for flexible labor market environments (see Appendix D).
A further consideration is whether the workers moving out of agriculture are likely to be
affected by the IDA. A priori we would expect these workers to enter the regulated formal
manufacturing sector as casual contract workers. This raises an important question about
the degree to which the labor regulation environment impacts the employment of casual
workers. Contract workers are not directly considered as workmen under the IDA and,
consequently, are not de jure regulated within manufacturing firms. However, this does not
mean that contract workers are not affected by the IDA (Bertrand et al., 2015, Chaurey,
2015). Contract workers are still de jure regulated by the IDA under the contractor that
hires them. Consequently, the availability of these workers to firms in rigid labor market
environments may be directly affected by the willingness of contractors to put these workers
on the books in response to transitory changes in the weather. In addition, contract workers
may be de facto affected by the IDA. On the one hand, the exemption of contract workers
from the IDA may provide an added incentive to hire contract workers in rigid labor markets,
allowing employers to bypass some of the regulations in the IDA. If so, this would imply that
the labor reallocation channel would be relatively larger in rigid labor market environments.
Looking at the data, one observes, consistent with this argument, that the share of firms
using contract workers – an extensive margin measure – is higher in rigid markets than
in flexible markets (see Figure 1). On the other hand, the use of contract workers has
been vigorously, and in some cases violently, opposed by unions and permanent workers,
suggesting that firms may face significant costs associated with hiring contract workers,
especially in rigid labor market environments. Furthermore, the Contract Labor Regulation
and Abolition Act of 1970 prohibits the use of contract labor if the work “is done ordinarily
through regular workmen in that establishment.” To the degree that this is enforced, this
restricts the degree to which firms can bypass the IDA. Consequently, in rigid labor market
environments, where it is expected that firms have to negotiate with unions over decisions
that affect the labor force, the hiring of contract workers, in response to transitory changes in
labor availability, may be restricted. In support of this premise we observe, on the intensive
margin, that the share of workers employed as contract workers is higher in flexible labor
market environments, suggesting that, conditional on hiring contract workers, firms in more
flexible markets are able to hire more casual workers than firms in rigid labor markets (see
Figure 1). Given that, on average, there is no difference in the total number of workers
employed by firms across labor regulation environments, this implies that there is a higher
proportion of contract workers in flexible than in rigid labor market environments (Table 7).
mitigating concerns that the results could be driven by the movement of firms around the size threshold.
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In practice, whether there is a differential propensity to hire more casual workers in rigid or
in flexible labor market environments is an empirical question. Most importantly, it does not
affect the identification of the labor reallocation effect, which simply requires that there be
a differential effect of temperature across labor regulation environments for regulated firms,
but not unregulated firms.
Despite providing evidence of bunching in the firm-size distribution in rigid labor mar-
ket environments, the fact that weather was not a driver of the amendments made to the
IDA, and that the spatial variation in the IDA does not appear to have a differential effect
on other unregulated sectors, threats to identification still remain if other factors that are
correlated with temperature, the labor regulation environment, and outcome variables differ
between regulated firms above the regulatory thresholds, but not unregulated firms below the
regulatory threshold. This threat can be tested directly as below the regulatory threshold,
there should be no direct differential impact of temperature on firms across labor regulation
environments, and any differences that do arise help to sign the bias of the effect on regu-
lated firms. The identification assumption is therefore that there are no other confounding
factors across labor regulation environments that differentially affect firms above the regu-
latory firm-size threshold, but don’t differentially affect firms below the regulatory firm-size
threshold. An initial examination of this assumption through simple difference-in-means
tests suggests that there do not appear to be any obvious differences in the characteristics
of firms that would raise concerns (Table 7). The following section presents the empirical
specification, allowing for a more formal test of this identification assumption.
4.3 Empirical Specification – Manufacturing Outcomes
To identify the sign and magnitude of the labor reallocation channel, I interact the net
effects of weather with a measure of the labor regulation environment, splitting the sample
at the regulatory firm-size threshold. The estimation equation for both samples is written
as follows,
log Yijdt = βf(wdt) + γf(wdt)× Flexibility + αjd + αjt + φst+ εijdt (1)
The dependent variable, Yijdt, is the natural log of: total output (sales), employment
(by worker type), the average day wage (by worker type), and various produtivity measures.
The unit of analysis is firm i, in sector j, in district d, at time t.
District × industry (αjd) fixed effects absorb all unobserved time-invariant variation
within these dimensions; industry × year (αjt) fixed effects control for sector-specific time-
varying differences in the dependent variable that are common across districts; and a set of
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flexible state-specific time trends (φst) relaxes the assumption that shocks or time-varying
factors that affect the outcome variables are common across districts.
As in the previous sections, f(wdt) is a function of rainfall and temperature,
f(wdt) = β1(Temperaturedt) + β2(Rainfalldt) (2)
where total rainfall is measured over the state-specific monsoon period and the daily
average temperature is measured over the agricultural year. As for the previous sections,
alternative specifications, accounting for non-linearities in the temperature schedule are pre-
sented in Appendix E.
The challenge associated with identifying the labor reallocation effect when estimating
the simple linear regression model, absent the interaction term, is that β captures the sum
of all empirically relevant channels through which temperature affects the manufacturing
outcomes. This identifies the effects of temperature, but does not provide an economic
interpretation.
The interaction term, f(wdt)×Flexibility, captures the differential propensity of firms
to absorb workers in response to increases in temperature. Flexibility is defined to allow
for a continuous measure of the labor regulation environment, based on Besley and Burgess
(2004), bounded between 0 and 1. West Bengal is the baseline state, coded 0 as it is the
most rigid labor regulation environment. Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu are coded as 1,
as they are the most flexible labor regulation environments.
For regulated firms γregulated, identifies the labor reallocation effect, net of the remain-
ing empirically relevant channels through which temperature effects manufacturing, β, if
γunregulated = 0. Any deviations from this condition provide the sign and magnitude of the
bias captured in γregulated if γunregulated is not zero. For example a positive differential effect
on unregulated firms would suggest that the estimated differential effect on regulated firms
would be upward biased. By contrast, a negative differential effect for unregulated firms
would suggest that the estimated differential effect on regulated firms would be downward
biased.
The last term is the stochastic error term, εdt. Standard errors are adjusted as in section
2.3.
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4.4 Results – Manufacturing
Unregulated Firms
I begin by examining the effects of temperature on unregulated firms. Below the regulatory
threshold, there should be no direct differential impact of temperature on firms across labor
regulation environments.22 As a result, these estimates do not disentangle the labor real-
location effect, but rather test an important identification assumption: that any additional
channels through which weather could affect manufacturing outcomes are constant across
labor regulation environments. This also tests for the presence of any additional spatial
differences such as general equilibrium effects or other policy differences that are correlated
with the spatial dimension of the labor regulation environment.
Tables 8 and 9 present results that provide direct evidence in support of the identification
assumption. Consistent with the results in section 3, I find evidence that an increase in
temperature is associated with a net expansion of economic activity in unregulated firms
(Panel A); however, there is limited evidence of a differential effect of temperature across
labor regulation environments on unregulated firms.
The one exception to this is a differential effect in total employment. However, given the
absence of other differential effects, it is plausible that this arises due to a spillover in the
labor regulation environment itself, rather than differences in the other empirically relevant
channels through which temperature affects manufacturing, or other policy or geographic
differences. We observe that in more flexible markets there is relatively less hiring in response
to temperature increases. This is consistent with the premise that the labor regulation
environment may have indirect effects on unregulated firms. If workers are not able to find
employment in the regulated sector of rigid labor market environments, we may expect a
relative expansion (accounting for the size threshold) of the unregulated sector.
While it is not clear why firms require or distinguish between casual and permanent
works in the unregulated market, it is interesting to note that the differential employment
effects appear to be driven by contract workers, the type of workers that we might expect a
priori to move in response to transitory changes in the demand for agricultural labor. For
example, while regulatory constraints are not binding for unregulated firms it is plausible
that firms may still have a preference to hire workers into temporary contract positions over
permanent positions for other reasons, such as differential administrative costs.
These results suggest two things: 1) that our estimates of the differential effect of tem-
perature are not likely to be biased due to confounding geographic or policy considerations
that may be correlated with the labor regulation environment; 2) that any other empirically
22As discussed there may be indirect effects of the regulation on unregulated firms.
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relevant channels through which temperature may affect manufacturing are constant across
labor regulation environments. However, estimates of the differential effect of temperature
on contract workers in regulated firms are likely to be a lower bound due to the potential
spillover effects of the labor regulation environment onto unregulated firms.
Regulated Firms
In light of the evidence above, suggesting that the other empirically relevant effects of temper-
ature are constant across labor regulation environments, and that other policy and geographic
considerations do not appear to be confounding the interpretation of the labor regulation
measure I proceed to explore the effects of temperature on regulated firms. Tables 10 and
11 present the results of this exercise.
First, I find evidence that there are limited net effects of temperature on manufactur-
ing output and employment in regulated firms, as well as net reductions in productivity
(Panel A). These results are consistent with, though not limited to, an expanding literature
which suggests that high temperatures may have an adverse effect on labor productivity
(Mackworth, 1946, 1947, Hsiang, 2010, Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014, Adhvaryu et al., 2015,
Graff Zivin et al., 2015, Somonathan et al., 2015). However, it is not clear whether the ab-
sence of employment and production effects are true zeros, or whether the labor reallocation
effect observed on net in unregulated firms is confounded by other competing temperature
effects.
In support of the latter interpretation I find differential effects of temperature across
labor regulation environments. In rigid labor market environments I find that increases in
temperature are associated with contractions in output, employment and productivity. By
contrast, in flexible labor regulation environments we observe relative expansions in output
and employment. This is consistent with the premise that firms in more flexible labor
market environments have a greater capacity to absorb workers in response to weather-
driven changes in agricultural productivity. In addition, we observe that firms are hiring
contract workers, with no net or differential change in the number of permanent workers,
consistent with anecdotal evidence and a priori reasoning. Related to the discussion of the de
facto impact of the labor regulation environment on contract workers, the relative increase
in the employment of contract workers in more flexible labor markets, suggests that firms
in more rigid labor markets may be incentivised against hiring contract workers, at least in
response to short-run changes in the availability of workers.
From the workers’ perspective, it is reasonable to suppose that agricultural workers on
casual contracts would be more likely to find casual work in the manufacturing sector before
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moving into permanent work. In addition, the presence of centralized contractors that pro-
vide firms with casual labor significantly reduces search costs for these positions compared
to permanent positions. This is consistent with the evidence provided by Bryan et al. (2014)
in Bangladesh, Franklin (2015) in Ethiopia, and Hardy and McCasland (2015) in Ghana,
who demonstrate that, in contexts without contractors, there are significant search costs
associated with finding employment.
From the firms’ perspective, the results are consistent with the premise that manufactur-
ing firms hire workers on casual contracts as a screening process, rather than hiring movers
into permanent contracts straight away. Employers face an adverse selection problem, as
they can only discern a worker’s true ability after a hiring decision has been made, especially
in the absence of employment histories. By using contract workers, firms can learn more
about a worker’s productivity before deciding whether to hire them permanently. This is
consistent with the evidence provided by Heath (2015) who finds that firms in Bangladeshi
garment factories hire workers through referrals to mitigate adverse selection and moral
hazard concerns. In doing so, firms can punish the referral provider if the new entrant is un-
productive. Hardy and McCasland (2015) also highlight the importance of worker screening
in the hiring decisions of firms in Ghana.
While there appears to be little impediment to moving across sectors within casual tasks,
the absence of employment into permanent manufacturing positions suggests that casual
and permanent labor markets are segmented, at least in the short run. Local labor markets
in developing countries can therefore be characterised as dualistic, not in terms of sectors
(agriculture vs. non-agriculture), but rather in terms of the type of employment in which
workers engage (casual vs. permanent). This raises an interesting question about the degree
to which casual workers face adjustment costs in the movement into permanent positions. As
noted, there is a significant wage gap between casual manufacturing workers and permanent
workers. However, while this gap exists, it is less clear how it should be interpreted. On
the one hand, wage gaps may represent significant adjustment costs, implying that there
are arbitrage opportunities to increase productivity if these costs could be reduced – a
misallocation of talent (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008, Hsieh and
Klenow, 2009, Moretti, 2011, Bryan et al., 2014, Gollin et al., 2014, Hsieh et al., 2014,
Bandiera et al., 2015a, Bryan and Morten, 2015, Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2015). On the
other hand, average wage gaps may simply represent differences in human capital between
casual and permanent workers, with low-skilled workers selecting into casual tasks and high-
skilled workers selecting into permanent tasks (Roy, 1951, Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985,
Heckman and Honore, 1990, Miguel and Hamory, 2009, Beegle et al., 2011, Lagakos and
Waugh, 2013, Young, 2013, 2015). This interpretation would suggest that, while average
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wage gaps across sectors exist, marginal productivities may be equalised across activities
– an efficient allocation of talent. Both of these channels may be further confounded by
differences in the bargaining power or amenities across tasks. As discussed, the evidence
presented so far, alongside evidence from worker-level mincerian wage regressions, suggests
that adjustment costs, to the degree that they exist, are limited across sectors within casual
activities.23
In addition to the relative expansion of employment and production in flexible labor regu-
lation environments, I also observe that temperature increases are associated with differential
wage and productivity effects. Consistent with the relative inflow of contract workers in flex-
ible labor regulation environments we observe a relative fall in the average wages of casual
workers in response to temperature increases. Furthermore, we observe that temperature
increases are associated with relative increases in the average wage of permanent workers.
Given that contract and permanent labor markets are segmented, i.e., we observe no increase
in the number of permanent workers, this suggests that the tasks that the casual entrants
and permanent workers engage in are complementary in production. Consistent with this
premise, we also observe relative increases in average labor productivity and measured TFPR,
as well as the number of products produced.24
A speculative interpretation of these findings is that the inflow of relatively low-skilled
casual workers, freeing up permanent workers to engage in more productive tasks, moving
firms down the average cost curve.
However, one concern may be that these effects are driven by accompanying changes in
other factors of production, confounding this interpretation of the results. Yet, one of the
attractive features of the empirical context and identification strategy is that the movement
of workers across sectors is driven by short-run changes in the weather and so one may con-
sider that other factors of production and the technology of the firm are held fixed. Table 12
directly tests this consideration. I begin by looking at the effects of temperature on capital
and capital depreciation. If capital were to increase alongside labor, then it would be diffi-
cult to attribute increases in productivity and permanent worker wages to the reallocation
of labor alone. Consistent with the premise that the other factors of production are held
23Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope and capacity of the data to provide inferences about the relative
contribution of these channels to the wage gap between casual and permanent manufacturing workers.
However, in appendix F I provide an upper bound on the gains from reallocation, under the assumption that
the total wage gap between casual and permanent workers is driven by adjustment costs. Understanding
the relative importance of the role that adjustment costs play in impeding the movement of workers out of
casual employment and into permanent positions remains an important area for future research.
24TFPR (CES) allows for imperfect substitution between contract and permanent workers using exogenous
estimates of the elasticity of substitution between contract and permanent workers combined with a nested
CES production function (see Appendix C for details on estimation).
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fixed, we observe that there is no change in capital or capital depreciation in response to
temperature changes, and that this effect does not vary across labor regulation environments.
Second, I consider the effects of temperature on the number of managers and the wages of
managers. While a crude measure of the organisational structure of the firm, this provides
some insights as to whether productivity increases could have been driven by organisational
change or whether the increase in permanent worker wages could be driven by the extraction
of rents from the firm. If this were the case then we may also expect managers to share in
these rents. We observe neither an increase in the number of managers nor changes in the
average wage of managers, suggesting that neither changes in management nor rent extrac-
tion appear to provide first-order explanations for the results. Finally, I explore whether the
firm expands the number of plants – a proxy for entry and exit considerations that are not
directly observable in the data. Again, we observe that the firm does not open or close plants
in response to changes in temperature, suggesting that there are unlikely to be significant
changes in the number of firms or in the market structure in response to changes in tem-
perature. These findings suggest that the productivity and wage results can be interpreted
as being driven by the increase in casual workers, rather than changes in other factors of
production or changes in the technology or management structure of the firm.
In addition to the supporting evidence presented here, a number of additional robustness
tests, including the removal of firms around the threshold, specification extensions that
account for non-linearities in the temperature distribution, alternative definitions of the
labor regulation environment and instrumental variable results, are presented in Appendices
D and E.
The above results highlight the problems associated with the identification and interpre-
tation of reduced-form weather results, but demonstrate the insights that can be gleaned
from attempting to isolate specific channels and mechanisms through which weather can
affect economic outcomes. I show that increases in temperature are associated with contrac-
tions of economic activity in rigid labor market environments, where firms are less able to
absorb workers in response to weather-driven changes in agricultural productivity. However,
in more flexible labor regulation environments I estimate that increase in temperature are
associated with a relative expansion of manufacturing production and the employment of
casual workers. However, unlike the effects of temperature on unregulated firms, this reallo-
cation does not result in a net increase in output for regulated firms, as the adverse effects
of temperature counteract the labor reallocation effect. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper, and indeed the capacity of the data, to identify the precise mechanisms through which
this residual net effect has an effect on manufacturing outcomes, one thing is clear: if these ef-
fects can be mitigated, the realised impact of temperature on manufacturing output through
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labor reallocation will be significantly larger, offsetting the economic losses associated with
temperature increases in agriculture. The following section explores various counterfactuals,
relating to the aggregate consequences of these mechansism.
5 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section I explore what my results imply for aggregate production in India. I consider
two sets of counterfactual experiments. First, I consider the counterfactual impact associ-
ated with shutting down labor reallocation by increasing the rigidity of the labor market
environment across India to the level of West Bengal (the most Pro-Worker State). Sec-
ond, I consider the counterfactual gains associated with shutting down the adverse effects of
temperature on manufacturing.
Baseline Effects
I begin by estimating the baseline effects of temperature on GDP, using data on sectoral
GDP for each district, focusing on agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services.
Table 13 presents the results of this exercise, showing that a 1◦C increase in temperature
is associated with a reduction in agricultural GDP (-11.6%/1◦C), a reduction in total man-
ufacturing GDP (-2.57%/1◦C), and no change in services or construction GDP. Overall, a
1◦C increase in temperature is associated with a 2.63% reduction in total GDP.25
To explore various counterfactual environments I split total manufacturing GDP into
three components: the informal manufacturing sector (34% of GDP), the regulated formal
manufacturing sector (22% of GDP) and the unregulated formal manufacturing sector (44%
of GDP). Taking as given the estimated effects of temperature on manufacturing output for
the regulated and unregulated formal manufacturing sector (presented in Panel A of tables
8 and 10), the residual effect of temperature on the informal sector, necessary to induce a
2.57% reduction in total manufacturing GDP, is -18.3%. These baseline figures are reported
in column 1 of Table 14.
Increasing the Rigidity of the Labor Market Environment
In columns 2, and 3 of Table 14 I consider the impact of increasing the rigidity of all labor
market environments in India to the levels of West Bengal (the most Pro-Worker State).
First, I consider the effects of increasing rigidity only in the regulated formal sector. I do
this by inducing a 15.3% reduction in output for firms in the most flexible labor markets
25The predicted effect on total GDP from aggregating the estimated effects of a 1 degree increase in
temperature on other sectors, i.e.,
∑
s βs ×GDPs/GDP is -3.03%.
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(Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu), the effect decreasing in the rigidity of the labor market
environment. As such, there is no change in output for West Bengal. In this counterfactual
environment a 1◦C increase in temperature would be associated with a 4.58% reduction
in manufacturing GDP and a 3.31% reduction in total GDP, corresponding to a 9.24%
increase in losses to total GDP. Secondly, I consider the effects of increasing the rigidity of
the labor market environment in the unregulated formal sector, equivalent to increasing the
scope of labor regulation to unregulated firms. In this counterfactual environment losses
are even greater. A 1◦C increase in temperature is associated with a 11.32% reduction
in manufacturing GDP and a 4.25% reduction in total GDP, corresponding to a 40.26%
increase in losses to total GDP. These simple counterfactuals highlight the importance of
labor mobility, as well as the importance of the local policy environment, in managing the
economic consequences of temperature increases.
Shutting Down the Adverse Effects of Temperature on Manufacturing Firms
Next, I consider how much of the losses to GDP could be offset by mitigating the adverse
effects of temperature on manufacturing. For example, one could imagine that these effects
could be attenuated through the use of cooling technologies.26 Due to the competing effects
of temperature on manufacturing, the net effect on regulated manufacturing firms is zero, and
so labor reallocation only offsets the losses associated with the adverse effects of temperature
for these firms. By setting the adverse effects of temperature to zero the labor reallocation
effect will be positive, offsetting losses to agricultural GDP.27
In column 4 I restrict my attention to regulated formal manufacturing firms. In this case,
a 1◦C increase in temperature is associated with a 1.01% increase in manufacturing GDP
and a 2.53% reduction in total GDP. This corresponds to a 16.5% reduction in losses to total
GDP.
In column 5, I allow the estimated effects to be extrapolated to the rest of the formal
manufacturing sector, expanding “cooling technologies” to unregulated formal manufacturing
firms. In this counterfactual a 1◦C increase in temperature is associated with a 7.74% increase
in manufacturing GDP, and a 1.59% reduction in total GDP. This corresponds to a 47.52%
reduction in losses to total GDP.
Finally, in column 6, I allow the estimated effects to be further extrapolated to the
26These counterfactual exercises do not address the costs associated with the implementation of such
technologies.
27One concern relating to the validity of this exercise is that firms may only be hiring workers in response
to the reductions in productivity associated with the adverse effects of temperature. Consequently, in the
absence of adverse temperature effects, firms may have limited capacity to expand production in the short
run. However, the net increase in output and employment for unregulated firms suggest that expansions in
response to year-to-year variations in temperature are possible.
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informal sector. I estimate that a 1◦C increase in temperature is associated with a 12.95%
increase in manufacturing GDP and a 0.86% reduction in total GDP. This corresponds to a
71.67% offset in losses to total GDP.
These results suggest that there could be significant gains from mitigating the adverse
effects of temperature on manufacturing, and that the movement of workers across sectors
could significantly offset the aggregate effects of temperature on local economic activity.
6 Conclusion
One of the salient features of economic life in developing countries is the centrality of agri-
culture to employment. Consequently, given the inextricable link between agricultural pro-
duction and the environment, understanding the relationship between economic and natural
systems can provide important insights into the economics lives of the poor. While we have
a reasonably good understanding about how weather affects agricultural markets, under-
standing how workers respond to changes in labor demand helps to provide insights into
the mechanisms through which climatic influence affects economic outcomes, as well as the
functioning of labor markets in developing countries.
Consistent with a large literature examining the effects of weather on agricultural pro-
duction, I estimate that temperature is a strong driver of short-run agricultural productivity.
However, I also estimate that there are no effects on agricultural prices, consistent with a
“law of one price”, indicating that Indian districts are reasonably well integrated with other
markets. A priori, this suggests that reductions in agricultural productivity should result in
an outflow of workers into other sectors due to a local change in comparative advantage.
Consistent with this premise, I present evidence to suggest that agricultural workers in
India are relatively able to move across sectors within local labor markets when temperature
increases, moving chiefly into the manufacturing sector. This movement completely offsets
the reduction in agricultural employment, with no increases in unemployment, or population
through migration, indicating that the ability of other sectors to absorb workers is a key
channel through which workers can manage reductions in the demand for their labor in
agriculture. These results highlight the role that market integration and diversification can
play in attenuating the aggregate consequences of sectoral productivity shocks.
In light of these results, I explore how this reallocation of labor across sectors affects
economic outcomes in the formal manufacturing sector, which is representative of tradable
industry in India. The principal challenge associated with identifying the effects of labor
reallocation is that there are many channels through which temperature could affect man-
ufacturing outcomes. Consequently, the estimated effect of temperature on manufacturing
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outcomes provides a net effect of all the empirically relevant channels, without a clear eco-
nomic interpretation.
To discern the impact of labor reallocation on these firms, I interact the net effects of
temperature with a combination of spatial and firm-level exposure to India’s labor regulation
environment, providing variation in the propensity of firms to absorb labor in response to
short-run changes in labor availability.
For unregulated firms I estimate that the net effect of temperature on production and
employment is positive and significant consistent with the premise that workers are able
to move across sectors in response to weather-driven changes in agricultural productivity.
However, importantly for identification, I estimate that there are no differences in the effects
of temperature across labor regulation environments, indicating that any additional chan-
nels, through which temperature affects manufacturing, are constant across labor regulation
environments. By contrast, for regulated firms I estimate a differential effect across labor
regulation markets. In rigid labor market environments, an increase in temperature is as-
sociated with a contraction in economic activity, consistent with a literature that suggests
that temperature is an important determinant of labor productivity. However, I demon-
strate that there is a relative expansion of output and the employment of low-skilled casual
workers in flexible labor regulation environments, consistent with the premise that regu-
lated firms in these environments have a greater propensity to absorb workers in response to
weather-driven changes in agricultural productivity. These results support the premise that
the ability of firms to absorb workers is a key channel through which workers are able to
manage agricultural productivity shocks, indicating that the local policy environment can
play an important role by affecting the ability of firms to absorb labor.
Furthermore, I estimate that this inflow of casual workers is associated with an increase
in the wages of permanent workers as well as increases in productivity, suggesting that there
may be complementarities between the tasks that casual and permanent workers engage in.
In support of this interpretation, I find that there are no changes in capital, management,
or the number of plants, suggesting that the effects are driven by labor reallocation, rather
than changes in other factors of production, or the technology or organization of the firm.
In considering the aggregate consequences of these effects, I explore two sets of coun-
terfactual exercises using data on district level, sectoral GDP. First, I estimate that in the
absence of labor reallocation total economic losses would be up to 40% larger, highlighting
the importance of labor mobility in attenuating the economic consequences of sectoral pro-
ductivity shocks. Second, I estimate that attenuating the adverse effects of temperature on
manufacturing could offset the aggregate effects of temperature by up to 72%, despite the
adverse effects that temperature increases have on the agricultural sector. This suggests that
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there could be considerable gains to managing the economic consequences of temperature in
non-agricultural sectors.
The findings of this paper have three main implications. First, regarding the labor
market decisions of the poor, my results suggest that workers in agriculture are highly
responsive to changes in the agricultural wage and employment opportunities, resulting
in movements across sectors within casual employment activities. These findings suggest
that low-skilled workers are relatively substitutable across sectors. However the absence
of movement into permanent manufacturing positions suggests that labor markets can still
be characterised as dualistic (Lewis, 1954). However, labor markets do not appear to be
dualistic across sectors (agriculture vs. non-agriculture) but rather in terms of the type
of employment activities in which workers engage (casual vs. permanent). Consequently,
when engaged in casual employment, the delineation of activities by sector may have little
relevance, with workers engaging in activities across sectors in rural or urban areas of the
local labor market. However, as workers move up the skill ladder into permanent jobs, the
delineation of employment by sector may start to become more important. Many important
research opportunities remain to help improve our understanding of whether workers face
constraints that impede their movement out of casual and into permanent employment, and
whether these constraints are amenable to policy.
Second, regarding the behaviour of firms, my results suggest that firms in India have
the potential to act as a major absorbers of labor, even in the short-run, highlighting the
importance of diversification in the management of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In ad-
dition, I demonstrate that even sectors considered to be considerably less climate-sensitive
than agriculture can be significantly affected by temperature increases, suggesting that we
may significantly underestimate the damages associated with future climate change if we fail
to account for non-agricultural impacts. Furthermore, in the face of competing mechanisms
we will underestimate the economic importance of these damages. Understanding the re-
lationship between environmental conditions and firm behaviour remains a fruitful area of
research; especially questions relating to how the management and innovation of firms may
help to manage short- and long-run environmental change.
Finally, regarding climatic influence on economic outcomes, my results show that workers
are relatively able to adapt to temperature increases by moving across sectors, and that the
ability of firms to absorb these movements is a key channel through which workers are able
to manage the effects of weather-driven changes in agricultural productivity. Consequently,
we may overestimate the damages associated with future climate change if we do not take
into account the adaptation responses of economic agents. Much more work is required
to understand how different institutions, systems, technologies, and policies may moderate
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the short-run and long-run environmental change so that we are better able to understand
the constraints that economic agents face in managing such change. In turn we can better
design and implement policy, where necessary, to mitigate the economic consequences of
environmental change, today and in the future.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Agriculture and Labor Markets in India (2001–2007)
Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
(within) (between)
Panel A: Agricultural Data
Yield 1.789 0.472 1.683
Value (Rs.) 19,300.67 10,392.71 22,245.56
Production (’000 Tonnes) 113.042 49.626 252.894
Area (’000 Hectares) 59.261 15.051 100.687
Price (Rs./Tonne) 11,995.1 4,012.233 7,431.825
Number of Crops 7.047 0 3,532
Average Crop Share 0.154 0.0276 0.216
Average Share of Main Crop 0.559 0.042 0.176
Panel B: Wage Data
Average Day Wage: Agriculture 56.482 15.822 21.988
Average Day Wage: Manufacturing 96.720 42.627 37.397
Average Day Wage: Services 186.403 45.826 37.786
Average Day Wage: Construction 81.458 33.010 29.123
Panel C: Employment Data
District Employment Share: Agriculture 0.445 0.095 0.147
District Employment Share: Manufacturing 0.225 0.062 0.086
District Employment Share: Services 0.183 0.046 0.057
District Employment Share: Construction 0.066 0.031 0.032
Unemployment Share of Labor Force 0.078 0.032 0.043
Panel D: Meteorological Data
Daily Average Temperature (◦C) 24.847 0.271 4.185
Degree Days (tL = 17, tH =∞) 3,103.204 90.757 809.660
Degree Days (tL = 0, tH = 17) 5,995.568 22.590 704.792
Monsoon Rainfall (mm) 927.297 206.509 482.657
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Table 2: The Effects of Weather on Agricultural Outcomes
logAgricultural Outcomes
Yield Value Price
(All Crops) (All Crops) (All Crops)
Daily Average Temperature (◦C) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ 0.000957
(0.0358) (0.0323) (0.0107)
Monsoon Rainfall (100mm) 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ -0.000795
(0.00375) (0.00347) (0.00181)
Fixed Effects Crop × District, Crop × Year
and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 9,813 9,813 9,813
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are
adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation
as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district
centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
Table 3: The Effects of Weather on Average Wages
log Average Day Wages
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Construction
Daily Average -0.0516∗∗ -0.0344 -0.0107 -0.0150
Temperature (◦C) (0.0240) (0.0558) (0.0630) (0.0452)
Monsoon Rainfall (100mm) -0.00611∗ -0.0136 -0.00344 -0.00171
(0.00365) (0.00873) (0.00727) (0.00700)
Fixed Effects District, Year, State-Year Time Trends
Observations 1,067 1,068 1,099 1,035
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted to
reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey
and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to
clustering standard errors at the State Level. Differences in observations across sectors arise due to
missing wage data.
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Table 4: The Effects of Weather on the District Labor Force Share of Employment - By
Sector
District Labor Force Shares
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Construction Unemployment
Daily Average -0.110∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.00115 -0.00596
Temperature (◦C) (0.0190) (0.0104) (0.00758) (0.00711) (0.00460)
Monsoon Rainfall -0.00298 0.00297∗ 0.00102 -0.00185 0.000836
(100 mm) (0.00309) (0.00161) (0.000976) (0.00123) (0.000742)
Fixed Effects District, Year, State-Year Time Trends
Average Share 0.445 0.225 0.183 0.066 0.078
Observations 1,105 1,105 1,105 1,105 1,105
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial
dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District
distances are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State
Level.
Table 5: The Effects of Weather in Foreign Districts on the Share of Employment in Desti-
nation Districts - By Sector
Destination District Labor Force Shares
Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Services Unemployment
Local Daily Average -0.100∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ -0.00132 -0.0127∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0170) (0.0113) (0.00763) (0.00701) (0.00569)
Local Monsoon Rainfall -0.00333 0.00304 0.00161 -0.00181 0.000479
(100 mm) (0.00327) (0.00185) (0.000980) (0.00125) (0.000838)
Foreign Daily Average -0.0800 -0.0166 0.0195 0.0209 0.0562∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0534) (0.0272) (0.0329) (0.0182) (0.0221)
Foreign Monsoon Rainfall 0.00172 -0.000899 -0.00491 -0.00000550 0.00410
(100 mm) (0.00702) (0.00408) (0.00352) (0.00245) (0.00308)
Fixed Effects District, Year, State-Year Time Trends
Average Share 0.445 0.225 0.183 0.066 0.078
Observations 1,105 1,105 1,105 1,105 1,105
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence
as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed
from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
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Table 6: Average Wage Gap (Agriculture vs. Manufacturing)
India Wide Within District Within District
Skill Adjusted
Average Wage Gap 1.335 1.139 1.094
(Casual Manufacturing Workers)
Average Wage Gap 2.210 1.936 1.540
(permanent Manufacturing Workers)
Average Day Wage in Agriculture (Rs.) 52.27 52.27 52.27
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Individual Controls No No Yes
Observations 50,832 50,832 50,818
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Individual level controls include
age, education, and gender. Estimates are based on individual-level mincerian wage regressions on the
working-age population (14-65) controlling for a sector dummy (β) specifying whether the individual is
engaged in agricultural, casual manufacturing labor, or permanent manufacturing employment. The wage
gap is calculated as exp(β). Individual controls include level of education, age, and gender.
Figure 1: Contract Workers Shares – by Labor Regulation Environment
Notes: Share of Contract Workers is defined as the share of contract workers in the labor
force conditional on hiring one contract worker, i.e., conditional on hiring contract workers,
we observe that Pro-Employer States hire more. Share of Firms is defined as the share of
firms that hire any contract workers, i.e., Firms in Pro-Worker States are more likely to hire
at least one contract worker compared to Pro-Employer States.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics - Manufacturing Firms in India (2001–2007)
Regulated Firms Unegulated Firms
Rigid States Flexible States Difference Rigid States Flexible States Difference
Total Output 2,130.215 1,572.613 -557.602 132.982 89.374 -43.607
(Million Rs.) (609.347) (508.357) (869.733) (37.141) (16.622) (46.319)
Total Employment 415.447 477.500 62.053 34.702 39.957 5.255
(Non-mangers) (94.964) (113.593) (198.128) (7.047) (4.833) (7.563)
Employment 54.354 191.157 136.802 12.361 9.977 -2.384
(Contract Workers) (11.793) (74.758) (75.682) (4.320) (2.785) (5.716)
Average Day Wage 156.273 140.061 -16.211 145.138 112.971 -32.167
(Contract Workers) (11.194) (7.689) (17.130) (29.158) (8.846) (36.825)
Employment 361.076 286.332 -74.744 22.340 29.980 7.640
(Regular Workers) (54.977) (25.177) (70.039) (4.170) (3.719) (5.655)
Average Day Wage 302.003 200.478 -101.525 195.141 129.019 -66.121
(Regular Workers) (71.131) (23.244) (87.473) (47.432) (12.269) (58.600)
Employment 53.119 42.526 -10.593 6.827 4.605 -2.221
(Managers) (11.282) (7.135) (16.136) (2.086) (0.677) (2.547)
Average Day Wage 871.471 658.062 -213.409 646.620 371.388 -275.232
(Managers) (173.962) (65.288) (219.641) (137.602) (41.575) (171.595)
Capital 1,483.548 1,229.230 -254.318 80.357 50.814 -29.543
(Million Rs.) (453.552) (407.124) (640.261) (27.135) (15.276) (32.173)
Items Produced 2.997 2.582 -0.414 2.482 2.067 -0.414
(0.558) (0.206) (0.700) (0.336) (0.170) (0.473)
Access to Electricity 0.991 0.987 -0.004 0.973 0.965 -0.007
(%) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.023) (0.014) (0.032)
Generates Own 0.441 0.643 0.201*** 0.142 0.398 0.255**
Electricity (%) (0.042) (0.043) (0.060) (0.091) (0.057) (0.106)
Output per Worker 3.739 2.358 -1.381 3.047 1.869 -1.178
(Million Rs.) (0.941) (0.523) (1.289) (0.560) (0.230) (0.718)
TFPR 6.119 6.082 -0.037 5.468 5.423 -0.045
(Log) (0.058) (0.066) (0.110) (0.029) (0.061) (0.083)
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Rigid States = 0, Flexible States = 1. The sample is restricted to
regulated firms. Standard errors are clustered at the State Level.
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Table 8: The Effects of Temperature on Manufacturing Firms – Unregulated Firms
log Output and Employment
Total Output Items Employment Employment Employment
Produced (All) (Contract) (Permanent)
Panel A: Net Effect
Daily Average 0.0888∗∗ -0.00753 0.0324∗∗ -0.0445 0.0326∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0346) (0.0106) (0.0149) (0.0304) (0.0171)
Panel B: Differential Effect
Daily Average 0.119∗ -0.0282 0.147∗∗∗ 0.0830 0.0959∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0708) (0.0271) (0.0289) (0.0887) (0.0407)
Temperature -0.0470 0.0321 -0.177∗∗∗ -0.201 -0.0985
× Flexible (0.0992) (0.0384) (0.0436) (0.136) (0.0608)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 65,934 65,934 65,921 21,751 60,302
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results from regression
the outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel B presents the differential effects
of temperature across labor regulation environments. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as
modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed
from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
Table 9: The Effects of Temperature on Manufacturing Firms – Unregulated Firms
log Wages and Productivity
Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Output TFPR
(All) (Contract) (Permanent) per Worker
Panel A: Net Effect
Daily Average 0.0110 0.00440 0.0181∗ 0.0449 0.0149
Temperature (◦C) (0.00898) (0.0129) (0.0108) (0.0300) (0.0156)
Panel B: Differential Effect
Daily Average -0.0236 -0.0171 -0.00817 -0.0372 0.0255
Temperature (◦C) (0.0275) (0.0329) (0.0306) (0.0684) (0.0388)
Temperature 0.0536 0.0340 0.0409 0.127 -0.0167
× Flexible (0.0388) (0.0517) (0.0422) (0.0973) (0.0537)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 65,921 21,751 60,302 65,934 57,143
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results from regression the outcome
variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel B presents the differential effects of temperature across
labor regulation environments. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and
serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Results
are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
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Table 10: The Effects of Temperature on Manufacturing Firms – Regulated Firms
log Output and Employment
Total Output Items Employment Employment
Produced (Contract) (Permanent)
Panel A: Net Effect
Daily Average -0.0101 -0.0516 0.0383 -0.0163
Temperature (◦C) (0.0341) (0.0333) (0.0236) (0.0114)
Panel B: Differential Effect
Daily Average -0.0971∗ -0.0497∗∗ -0.170∗∗ 0.00283
Temperature (◦C) (0.0540) (0.0220) (0.0667) (0.0382)
Temperature 0.153∗ 0.0588∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.0626
× Flexible (0.0880) (0.0337) (0.104) (0.0505)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 36,985 36,985 18,712 35,818
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results from regression
the outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel B presents the differential effects
of temperature across labor regulation environments. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence
as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances
are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
Table 11: The Effects of Temperature on Manufacturing Firms – Regulated Firms
log Wages and Productivity
Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Output TFPR TFPR
(Contract) (Permanent) per Worker (CES)
Panel A: Net Effect
Daily Average -0.0299 -0.0413∗∗ -0.0434∗∗ -0.0301∗ -0.0299∗∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0299) (0.0178) (0.0184) (0.0159) (0.0110)
Panel B: Differential Effect
Daily Average 0.0335 -0.0774∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗ -0.0958∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0333) (0.0221) (0.0513) (0.0299) (0.0313)
Temperature -0.113∗∗ 0.0838∗∗ 0.128 0.0969∗∗ 0.101∗∗
× Flexible (0.0495) (0.0352) (0.0838) (0.0438) (0.0446)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 18,712 35,818 36,985 33,440 33,464
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results from regression the
outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel B presents the differential effects of tem-
perature across labor regulation environments. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled
in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from
district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
48
Table 12: Additional Manufacturing Firm Outcomes – Regulated Firms
log Capital, Management, and Entry
Capital Capital Employment Day Wage Number
Depreciation Managers Managers of Plants
Panel A: Net Effect
Daily Average 0.0571 0.0329 0.0323 -0.0240∗ 0.00677
Temperature (◦C) (0.0442) (0.0263) (0.0220) (0.0144) (0.00646)
Panel B: Differential Effect
Daily Average 0.104 0.0595 -0.00464 -0.0358 0.00179
Temperature (◦C) (0.0730) (0.0530) (0.0442) (0.0315) (0.0156)
Temperature -0.0830 -0.0482 0.0651 0.0208 0.00879
× Flexible (0.114) (0.0823) (0.0718) (0.0496) (0.0242)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 36,810 29,454 36,550 36,550 36,985
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect
spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987).
District distances are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the
State Level.
Table 13: The Effects of Temperature on GDP
Total GDP Agricultural GDP Services GDP Manufacturing GDP Construction GDP
Daily Average -0.0263∗ -0.116∗∗ -0.0257∗ -0.0120 0.0183
Temperature ◦C (0.0136) (0.0571) (0.0144) (0.00963) (0.0232)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects District, Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All dependent variables are in logs. Standard errors
are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and
West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at
the State Level.
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Table 14: Counterfactual Estimates
Baseline Shutting Down No adverse
Labor Reallocation Temperature Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) 5 6
Informal (34%) -18.3% -18.3% -18.3% -18.3% -18.3% -3%
Unregulated Formal (44%) 8.8% 8.8% -6.5% 8.8 24.1% 24.1%
Regulated Formal (22%) -1.01% -15.3%×Flexibility -15.3%×Flexibility 15.3% 15.3% 15.3%
Total Manufacturing Effect -2.57% -4.58% -11.32% 1.01% 7.74% 12.95%
Total Effect -3.03% -3.31% -4.25% -2.53% -1.59% -0.86%
(Aggregate)
Change (%) – 9.24% 40.26% -16.50% -47.52% -71.67%
Notes: Column 1 (Baseline) provides a decomposition of the effect of a 1◦C increase in temperature on manufacturing GDP
decomposed into the regulated and unregulated formal manufacturing sector, using the estimated effects of a 1◦C increase
in temperature on firm-level output, and the informal sector, whereby the effect is the residual effect of a 1◦C increase in
temperature on firms in the informal sector to produce the estimated effect on manufacturing GDP. Columns 2, and 3 consider
the effects of increasing the rigidity of the labor market environment to the level of West Bengal (the most Pro-Worker State).
Column 2 increases the rigidity within the regulated formal manufacturing sector, and column 3 increases the rigidity in both
the regulated and unregulated formal manufacturing sector, equivalent to expanding the coverage of the IDA. Columns 4, 5
and 6 consider the consequences of shutting down the adverse effects of temperature on manufacturing. Column 4 turns off the
adverse effects of temperature for firms in the regulated formal manufacturing sector. Column 5 turns off the adverse effects of
temperature for firms in the regulated and unregulated formal manufacturing sector (under the assumption that the adverse
effects are constant across these two sectors). Column 6 turns off the adverse effects of temperature for firms in the formal and
informal sector (under the assumption that the adverse effects are constant across these three sub-sectors).
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Online Appendices – Not for Publication
A Theory Appendix
This appendix presents a simple model based on Matsuyama (1992) demonstrating how the
direction of labor reallocation in response to a sector-specific productivity shock depends
on market integration. Any analysis of labor reallocation across sectors within an economy
necessitates a diversified economy and so for simplicity I consider two sectors: agriculture
(a) and manufacturing (m).
Preferences
Consider a country composed of a large number of regions i. Each location i is populated
by a continuum of workers Li, which are assumed to be mobile between sectors, immobile
between regions, supplied inelastically, and fully employed. Workers earn income wijLij
and preferences are defined over two types of goods agriculture and manufactured goods.
Agricultural consumption is subject to subsistence constraints with a Stone-Geary utility
function (Matsuyama, 1992; Caselli and Coleman, 2001; Jayachandran, 2006; Desmet and
Parente, 2012).28 Given prices in sector j, pij and total income wiLi, each worker maximises
Ui = (Cia − a¯)αCim1−α (3)
which they maximise subject to their budget constraint,
piaCia + pimCim ≤ Liwi (4)
Worker demand for goods in agriculture, Dia = piaa¯+α(Liwi− piaa¯). For manufactured
goods Dim = (1 − α)(Liwi − piaa¯). As such, preferences are non-homothetic. Higher food
subsistence requirements, higher prices, and lower incomes are associated with an increase
in the demand for agricultural goods (Dia/Liwi).
Production
There are 2 goods that can be produced in each location i, agricultural good a and man-
ufactured goods m.29 I assume that all regions have access to the same technology and so
28Non-homothetic preferences can also be incorporated through a CES utility function where the elasticity
of substitution between agricultural goods and other goods is less than one (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007;
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2014).
29I will refer to goods and sectors interchangeably.
1
production functions do not differ across regions within each industry. Different industries
may have different production functions. Consequently, I drop the locational subscript unless
necessary.
Output of each good j is produced according to the following production function,
Yj = AjFj(Lj) (5)
where Aj is sector-specific productivity and Lj is the set of workers in sector j. I assume
that Fj(0) = 0, Fj
′ > 0 and Fj ′′ < 0. In addition, I assume that AaF 1(1) > a¯L > 0. This
inequality states that agriculture is productive enough to provide the subsistence level of
food to all workers. If this condition is violated then workers receive negative infinite utility.
Each firm equates its demand for labor to the value of the marginal product of labor.
Consequently, as market clearing requires that La + Lm = L, the marginal productivity of
labor will be equalised across sectors,
paAaFa
′(La) = w = pmAmFm′(Lm) (6)
Equilibrium
Autarky and Equilibrium Prices
Equilibrium is defined as a set of prices, wages, and an allocation of workers across sectors
such that goods and labor markets clear. In a state of autarky, the price ensures that the
total amount produced is equal to total consumption in each location, so that,
Ca = AaFa(La) (7)
Cm = AmFm(Lm)
Maximisation of equation 3 implies that each worker consumes agricultural goods such
that,
paCa = a¯+
αpmCm
1− α (8)
Combining this result with the profit maximisation condition (equation 6), the labor
market clearing condition (Lm = 1 − La), and the fact that total production must equal
total consumption yields,
Ω(Lm) =
a¯
Aa
(9)
2
where,
Ω(Lm) ≡ Fm(Lm)− Fm
′(Lm)Fa(1− La)
Fa
′(1− La) (10)
In addition, it is the case that Ω(0) = Fm(1), Ω(1) < 0 and Ω
′(·) < 0.
Consequently, in equilibrium a unique interior solution will arise for the employment
share in manufacturing Lm,
Lm = Ω
−1
(
a¯
Aa
)
(11)
As preferences are non-homothetic the demand for agricultural goods (food) decreases
as income increases (Engel’s law). Consequently, an increase (decrease) in agricultural pro-
ductivity will push (pull) workers into the manufacturing (agricultural) sector. Similarly, a
decrease (increase) in the subsistence constraint a¯ will push (pull) workers into the manu-
facturing (agricultural) sector.
Trade and Equilibrium Prices
Without opportunities to trade, consumers must consume even their worst productivity
draws. The ability to trade breaks the production-consumption link. In the case of free
trade prices, set globally, are taken as given. If the world price for a good j, p¯j, exceeds the
autarkic local price pij, firms and farms will engage in arbitrage and sell to the global market.
By contrast, if the world price for a good j is less than the autarkic local price consumers
will import the product from outside of the local market. Consequently, local demand does
not affect the allocation of labor across sectors, i.e., changes in Aij do not affect prices.
As discussed above the rest of the world differs only in terms of agricultural and manu-
facturing productivity, Ai′a and Ai′m. Profit maximisation in the rest of the world implies
that,
paAi′aFi′a
′(Li′a) = pmAi′mFi′m′(Li′m) (12)
Within industry production functions are assumed to be constant across regions. Under
the assumption of free trade and incomplete specialisation manufacturing employment in
region i, Lim, is now determined jointly by equations 6 and 12. Taking the ratio of these
equations provides the following equality,
Fim
′(Lim
Fia
′(Lia)
=
AiaAi′m
Ai′aAim
Fi′m
′(Li′m)
Fi′a
′(Li′a)
(13)
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As Fim
′(Lim)
Fia
′(Lia)
is decreasing in Lim it follows that,
Lim R Lia iff
Ai′a
Ai′m
R Aia
Aim
(14)
In this case an increase (decrease) in agricultural productivity will pull (push) workers
into the agricultural (manufacturing) sector, due to a change in local comparative advantage.
This is demonstrated in figure 1
Figure 1: The Effect of a Reduction in Agricultural Productivity on Equilibrium Employment
Shares (Free Trade)
In the case of costly trade, firms (farms) will engage in aribtrage opportunities as before;
however, the local price is bounded by a trade cost δ. Consequently, a trader will engage in
arbitrage, selling on the global market, as long as the global price is greater than the local
price net of trade costs, i.e., p¯j/δ > p
A
j . Conversely, consumers will import from the global
market if the local price is greater than the global price net of trade costs, i.e., p¯j < p
A
j /δ.
Consequently, in the case of homogenous traders where all agents face a constant iceberg
trade cost, the local price is bounded by the global price, i.e.,
p¯j
δ
≤ pAj ≤ p¯jδ.
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B Data appendix
B.1 Agricultural Data Appendix
This section provides additional details on the Agriculture data used in section III.
As discussed in the main paper, the data is collected from the ICRISAT Village Dynamics
in South Asia Macro-Meso Database (henceforth VDSA) which is compiled from a number
of official government datasources. Figures 1 provides summary statistics for the 12 crops
used.
Figure 1: Average: (TL) Production; (TR) Cultivated Land Area; (BL) Yield; (BR) Price
(2001 Rs.)
We observe from the figures that both Rice and Wheat are the most produced crops in
terms of cultivated land area and total production (figure 1) and that they also comprise the
largest share of production and cultivated land area within-district (figure 2). However, in
terms of yields sugarcane is show to have one of the highest yields and has the largest share
of yields within-district (figure 2).
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Figure 2: District Shares of: (TL) Agricultural Production; (TR) Agricultural Cultivated
Land; (B) Agricultural Yields
B.2 NSS Data Appendix
This section provides additional details on the NSS Employment and Unemployment surveys
used in section III. The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) carries out all-India,
large sample, household surveys on employment and unemployment every few years. This
paper takes advantage of the 60th round (January 2004 – June 2004), the 61st round (July
2004 – June 2005), the 62nd round (July 2005 – June 2006), and the 64th round (July 2007
– June 2008).
Using this data I construct average day wage for agricultural workers, manufacturing
workers, services workers and construction workers. Looking at the breakdown of employ-
ment between rural and urban areas it is clear that non-agricultural activities are not re-
stricted to urban areas.
As one might expect agricultural employment is largely focused in rural areas account-
ing for an average of 60% of rural employment during this period. However, employment
manufacturing and services account collectively for just over 25% of rural employment. By
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Table B1: Labor Force Shares in India
(2001–2007)
Rural Urban Combined
Agriculture 59.7% 7.8% 42.7%
Manufacturing 14.6% 40% 22.9%
Services 11.5% 35.7% 19.4%
Construction 5.9% 7.6% 6.5%
Unemployment 8.1% 8.6% 8.3%
contrast, in urban areas manufacturing and services account for close to 75% of employ-
ment. This is consistent with one of the most striking features of India’s recent spatial
development, namely the expansion of India’s metropolitan areas into rural areas, referred
to peri-urbanization (see Colmer (2015) for a more detailed discussion and review of this
literature). In the last decade there has been an official increase in urban agglomerations by
25% with populations shifting outwards. Henderson (2010) presents evidence in support of
this industrial decentralization for the Republic of Korea and Japan. Desmet et al. (forth-
coming) and Ghani et al. (2014) also provide supporting evidence for this process in India.
Desmet et al. (forthcoming) show that the services sector has become increasingly concen-
trated over time, while manufacturing has become less concentrated in districts that were
already concentrated and has increased in districts which originally were less concentrated.
Ghani et al. (2014) look more specifically at the manufacturing sector and document its
movement away from urban to rural areas, comparing the formal and informal sectors. The
authors argue that the formal sectors is becoming more rural; however, in practice a lot of
this movement is likely sub-urbanization, rather than ruralisation, in which firms move to the
outskirts of urban areas where they can exploit vastly cheaper land and somewhat cheaper
labor. Colmer (2015) finds evidence consistent with these papers finding that manufactur-
ing employment growth has become more concentrated in districts which were initially less
concentrated, and that this employment growth is significantly higher in less concentrated
rural areas compared to less concentrated urban areas.
This process of peri-urbanization also benefits workers reducing the cost of sectoral ad-
justment and migration costs. Indeed, in many instances it may reduce the need to migrate
altogether with workers choosing to commute from home, rather than migrate to urban areas.
This is consistent with the non-trivial shares of manufacturing employment and agricultural
employment presented in rural and urban areas respectively. Interestingly, we observe that
the unemployment share in urban areas is almost twice the size of those in rural areas,
suggesting that there is more absorptive capacity in rural areas.
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B.3 Weather Data Appendix
This section provides additional details on the weather data used throughout this paper.
Figure 3: Intra-Annual Weather Variation
4
Figure 4: Inter-Annual Weather Variation
5
Figure 5: Spatial Weather Variation
6
B.4 ASI Data Appendix
This section provides additional details on the Annual Survey of Industries Establishment-
level Microdata.
I begin by extracting a subset of variables from the raw data separately for each year and
then append each year together before apply the following cleaning processes, summarised
in table B2 With this initial sample I begin by dropping all plants that are outside of the
manufacturing sector, closed. In addition, I remove all observations with missing or zero
total output data due to the importance of the revenue and productivity results. I then
combine this data with the weather data taken from the ERA-Interim Reanalysis Data
archive. Finally, I drop Union Territories and remove all districts with zero agricultural
production. This is due to the focus on agricultural productivity shocks as a driver of labor
reallocation.
All financial amounts are deflated to constant 2001-02 Rupees.30 Revenue (gross sales)
is deflated by a three-digit commodity price deflator available from the “Index Numbers
of Wholesale Prices in India - By Groups and Sub-Groups (Yearly Averages)” produced
by the Office of the Economic Adviser in the Ministry of Commerce & Industry.31 Material
inputs are deflated by constructing the average output deflator for a given industry’s supplier
industries based on India’s 1993-94 input-output table, available from the Central Statistical
Organization. Fuel and Electricity costs are deflated by the price index for “Fuel, Power,
Light, and Lubricants”. Capital is deflated by an implied national deflator calculated from
“Table 13: Sector-wise Gross Captial Formation” from the Reserve Bank of India’s Handbook
of Statistics on the India Economy.32 Wage costs are deflated using a national GDP deflator.
30Thank you to Hunt Allcott, Allan Collard-Wexler, and Stephen O’Connel for publicly providing the
data and code to conduct this exercise.
31Available from http://www.eaindustry.nic.in/
32Available from http://www.rbi.org.in
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Table B2: ASI Sample Selection
Action Taken Observations Dropped Final Sample
Initial Sample - 371,383
Drop Sectors Outside of Manufacturing 22,645 348,739
Drop Closed Plants 90,115 258,624
Merge Weather Data 16,196 235,679
Drop Union Territories 1,727 233,952
Drop if Employment < 10 56,269 177,683
Drop if Employment < 20 & No Electricity 1,139 176,544
Drop Total Output Zero or Missing 19,989 156,555
Merge with Deflators 9 156,546
Keep Agricultural Districts 53,273 103,273
Plants-Year Observations Above the Threshold - 36,985
Plants-Year Observations Below the Threshold - 65,934
8
C Productivity Estimation
In what follows I provide an explicit model of TFPR, in the context of a profit-maximising
firm.
Each firm i, in time t, produces output Qit using the following (industry-specific) tech-
nology:
Qit = AitK
αk
it M
αm
it E
αE
it L
αL
it
where Kit is the capital input, Lit is the labor input, Mit is the materials input, and Eit
is the electricity input. Furthermore, I assume constant returns to scale in production so
αM + αE + αK + αL = 1.
The demand curve for the firm’s product has a constant elasticity:
Qit = BitP
−
it
Combining these two equations I obtain an expression for the sales-generating production
function:
Sit = ΩitK
βk
it M
βM
it E
βE
it L
βL
it
where Ωit(true) = A
1− 1

it B
1

it , and βX = αX(1− 1 ) for X ∈ {K,L,M,E}. Within the confines
of this paper, I define true productivity as ωit ≡ log(Ωit).
To recover a measure of ωit, I compute the value of βL, βM , and βE using median regression
for each industry-year cell.
βX = median
({
PXit Xit
Sit
})
for X ∈ {L,M,E}
To recover the coefficient on capital, βK , I use the assumption of constant returns to scale
in production, i.e.,
∑
X αX = 1, such that:
βK =
− 1

− βL − βM − βE
For ease of measurement I set  to be constant for all firms. Following Bloom (2009) I
set  = 4. Using these estimates I compute ωit,
ωit(est) = log(Sit)− βK log(Kit)− βM log(Mit)− βE log(Eit)− βL log(Lit)
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C.1 Allowing for Differences in the Elasticity of Substitution Within
Labor
As suggested by the empirical results contract labor does not appear to perfectly substi-
tutable with permanent labor as implied under the Cobb-Douglas production function. This
section presents an alternative production function, used to estimate productivity allowing
for imperfect substitutability between these two labor types. Specifically, I estimate a nested
Cobb-Douglas production function, in which the aggregate labor factor is a CES function of
Contract and Permanent Labor.
As above the top-level sales-generating production function is Cobb-Douglas,
Sit = ΩitK
βk
it M
βM
it E
βE
it L
βL
it
However, the Labor input is CES, i.e.,
Lit = [θcL
σ−1
σ
cit + θpL
σ−1
σ
pit ]
σ
σ−1
In the event that contract workers and permanent workers are perfectly substitutable
this production function collapses back to the standard Cobb-Douglas production function.
Given the results presented in the main text, each of the parameters in the CES structure
are observed or estimated. θcLcit = w¯citLcit, i.e. the wage bill of the firm for each labor type.
Given that contract and permanent labor markets are segmented, i.e., we observe no
increase in the number of permanent workers, this suggests that the tasks that the casual
entrants and permanent workers engage in are complementary in production. In light of
this, it is possible to provide an exogenous estimate of the elasticity of substitution, σ,
between the new entrants into casual positions and the incumbent permanent workers. If
σ < 1 the new entrant casual workers and incumbent permanent workers engage in tasks
that are complementary in production. If σ > 1 then these workers engage in tasks that are
substitutable in the production process.
σ ∝ ∂ logw
p
m
∂Temperature
/
∂ logLcm
∂Temperature
=
∂ logwpm
∂ logLcm
= 0.39 (15)
These results suggest that a 1% increase in the number of casual workers, employed
out of agriculture, is associated with a 0.39% increase in the average wage of permanent
manufacturing workers. To the degree that new entrants out of agriculture and incumbent
casual workers are substitutable in tasks, this would indicate that, on average, contract and
permanent workers in the regulated Indian manufacturing sector engage in complementary
production tasks.
10
With these parameters in hand I construct LCESit for each firm and then estimate pro-
ductivity using the CES labor input in place of the Cobb-Douglas Labor input.
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D The Labor Regulation Environment – Supporting
Evidence
This appendix provides supporting evidence for the identification strategy that exploits spa-
tial variation and firm-level exposure to India’s labor regulation environment.
D.1 Bunching in the Firm-Size Distribution
First I examine the degree to which there is bunching in the firm-size distribution, exploiting
differences in the incentives that firms face across different states as well as differences in
the regulatory thresholds. Previous work has argued that there little evidence of bunching
in the firm-size distribution associated with the Industrial Disputes Act (Hsieh and Olken,
2013). However, I demonstrate that the absence of bunching in this previous work arises due
to three considerations: 1) applying a nationwide threshold of 100, rather than state-specific
thresholds; 2) not distinguishing between pro-worker (where bunching is more likely) and
pro-employer states (where bunching is less likely); 3) conflation between the effect of the
IDA and changes in the sampling schedule around the modal threshold of 100 workers. In
the results presented below I use the year 2007 as this has the largest sample to maximize
power; however, results are robust to other years. Furthermore, all results account for the
sampling weights in order not to minimize the conflation of changes in the sample schedule
with changes arising from the IDA.
I demonstrate that in West Bengal, arguably the state with the most rigid labor regulation
environment, that there is a bunching of firms just below the regulatory threshold of 50
workers. However, there is no bunching for the other states around this threshold, in support
of the identification strategy.
Identifying bunching around the regulatory threshold of 100 is more challenging as this
coincides with a change in the sampling scheme of the ASI, in which there is an oversampling
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above this threshold. Despite accounting for sampling weights, we observe that there is
limited bunching just above the regulatory threshold. This is the complete opposite to what
one should expect. In rigid states there should be bunching to the left of the threshold, and
for flexible states this bunching should be smaller, consistent with the observed bunching in
West Bengal at the 50 worker threshold. Due to the fact that the sampling scheme of the
ASI coincides with the regulatory threshold it is impossible to identify or rule out bunching
at this level. However, it is interesting to note that we observe stronger bunching to the
right of a placebo regulatory threshold of 100 for West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, where
there is no actual threshold in place. This provides support for the conclusion that the
sampling scheme of the ASI interferes with the identification. The limited bunching to the
right of the regulatory threshold in the other states, suggests that in the absence of the
change in the sampling scheme we would observe some though limited bunching to the left
of the regulatory threshold at 100 workers.
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In further support of the assumption that the sampling scheme interferes with the iden-
tification strategy I don’t find any differences around the regulatory threshold of 300 in
“flexible” Uttar Pradesh. This suggests that there isn’t anything fundamentally related to
the labor regulation environment in flexible states that would result in bunching to the right
of the regulatory threshold.
Collectively, this evidence suggests that by accounting for state-specific thresholds and
distinguishing between flexible and rigid labor markets (as opposed to grouping all states),
one can uncover evidence of bunching in the firm-size distribution associated with the Indus-
trial Disputes Act. Consequently, this suggests that regulated firms may well face differential
incentives in the propensity to hire workers in response to transitory labor demand shocks.
D.2 Temperature isn’t correlated with Amendments made to the
Industrial Disputes Act
In this section I demonstrate that temperature didn’t appear to be a determinant of amend-
ments made to the IDA, using data on the year and state of amendments made. Given that
the weather data is only available from 1979, I am unable to look at amendments prior to
this. Between 1979 and 1995 18 amendments out of a total of 39 were made.
The results suggest that temperature is not correlated with the introduction, direction,
or magnitude or amendments made. Even the largest coefficient in column (3) accounting
for the magnitude of amendment changes, suggests that a 1 standard deviation increase in
temperature is associated with at most an additional 0.022 pro-worker amendments. Rainfall
does not appear to be correlated with whether an amendment was mode or the direction
of amendment changes on average. However, when the magnitude changes are taken into
account a one standard deviation increase in rainfall is associated with an additional 0.12
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Table D1: The Effects of Temperature on Amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act
(1) (2) (3)
Any Change Relative Change Total Change
Daily Average 0.00107 0.0310 0.0682
Temperature (◦C) (0.0584) (0.0530) (0.119)
Monsoon 0.0167 0.0176 0.0677∗∗
Rainfall (100mm) (0.0128) (0.0109) (0.0263)
Observations 272 272 272
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The unit
of analysis is a state-year. Any Change relates to whether an amendment was
made. Relative Change accounts for the direction of any amendment changes,
i.e., whether it was pro-worker or pro-employer. Total Change accounts for
the magnitude and direction of the change, e.g., if 3 pro-worker amendments
were made a value of -3 would be assigned to that state in that year. Standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999)
and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances
are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard
errors at the State Level.
pro-worker amendments. While statistically significant, the magnitude of this effect is not
particularly large. Most importantly, this does not affect the inference associated with the
evaluation of temperature.
D.3 The Effect of the Labor Regulation Environment on Unreg-
ulated Sectors
Finally, I explore whether there are any noticeable differences in temperature effects across
labor regulation environments through an examination of unregulated sectors such as agri-
culture, services and construction. I find limited evidence to suggest that there are significant
differences in the effects temperature effects across labor regulation environments when look-
ing at these unregulated sectors, or the manufacturing broadly defined to include both the
formal sector (those above and below the regulatory threshold) and the informal sector.
These results provide further support for the identification strategy as they suggest that
there are no first-order spatial differences between the collection of states that make up rigid
and flexible labor regulation environments, that are likely to bias the estimated effects on
regulated firms.
15
Table D2: The Differential Effect of Temperature on Real GDP - By Sector (2001 – 2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Agriculture Manufacturing Services Construction
Daily Average -0.00221 -0.0939∗ -0.0759∗∗ 0.0113 0.112∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0145) (0.0543) (0.0344) (0.0166) (0.0503)
Temperature -0.0353 -0.0324 0.0736 -0.0342 -0.137∗
× Flexibility (0.0226) (0.0798) (0.0452) (0.0236) (0.0709)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects District, Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted
to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in
Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Results are
robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
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E Additional Results and Robustness Tests
This appendix provides a series of additional results and robustness tests to support of the
main results presented in the paper.
E.1 Non-Linearities in the Temperature Schedule
In this section I explore the degree to which there are non-linearities in the temperature
schedule. A large literature in agricultural science has demonstrated that the relationship
between agricultural yields and weather is highly nonlinear (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009;
Auffhammer and Schlenker, 2014). To account for these non-linearities I explore two exer-
cises. First, I apply the concept of growing degree days, which measure the amount of time
a crop is exposed between a given lower and upper bound with daily exposures summed
over the season. Denoting the lower bound as tl, the upper bound as th, and td as the daily
average temperature on a given day,
GDDd;tl;th =

0 if td ≤ tl
td − tl if tl < td < th
th − tl if th ≤ td
(16)
These daily measures are then summed over the period of interest.33 This approach is
appealing for several reasons. First, the existing literature suggests that this simple function
delivers results that are very similar to those estimated using more complicated functional
forms (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Burgess et al. 2016; Burke and Emerick, 2015). Sec-
ondly, these other functional forms typically feature higher order terms, which in a panel
setting means that the unit-specific mean re-enters the estimation, as is the case with using
the quadratic functions (McIntosh and Schlenker, 2006). This raises both omitted vari-
able concerns, as identification in the panel models is no longer limited to location-specific
variation over time.
Using the notion of GDD, I model weather as a simple piecewise linear function of
temperature and precipitation,
33For example, if we set tl equal to 0
◦C and th equal to 24◦C then a given set of observations
{−1, 0, 8, 12, 27, 30, 33}, would provide GDDdt;0;24 = {0, 0, 8, 12, 24, 24}. Similarly if we wanted to con-
struct a piecewise linear function setting tl equal to 24 and th equal to infinity the second “piece” would
provide CDDdt;24;∞ = {0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 9}. These values are then summed over the period of interest, in this
case CDDdt;0;24 = 68 and CDDdt;24;∞ = 15. This approach accounts for any differences in the response to
this temperature schedule relative to a different schedule with the same daily average temperature.
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f(wdt) = β1GDDdt;tl;th + β2GDDdt;th;∞ + β3Raindt (17)
The lower temperature “piece” is the sum of GDD between the lower bound tl = 0 and
kink-point th. The upper temperature “piece” has a lower bound of th and is unbounded
above. The kink-point in the distribution th is determined by estimating an agricultural
production function, looping over all possible thresholds and selecting the model with the
lowest root-mean-square error. This results in a kink-point at 17◦C. This kink-point is
applied to all results for consistency.
The second approach explores the effects of non-linearities in the temperature schedule
captures the distribution of daily temperatures in district d within year t, by counting the
number of days that the daily average temperature fell within the jth bin of 10 temperature
bins. I estimate separate coefficients for each of the temperature bin regressors, using the
modal bin as a reference category to minimize multicollinearity concerns. So as to retain
power, I restrict the lowest bin to contain all days that are < 15◦C and the highest bin
to contain all days that are > 31◦C. Each of the bins between are 2◦C wide. Using this
approach I model weather as a flexible function of temperature and precipitation,
f(wdt) =
10∑
j=1
βjTempdtj + β3Raindt (18)
This approach makes a number of assumptions about the effects of daily temperatures
on the outcomes explored, as discussed in Burgess et al. (2016). First, the approach assumes
that the impact of daily temperature is determined by the daily mean alone, rather than
intra-day variations in temperature. Second, the approach assumes that the impact of a
day’s average temperature on the outcome of interest is constant within each 2◦C interval.
Finally, by using the total number of days in each bin in each year, it is assumed that they
sequence of relatively hot and cold days is irrelevant for how hot days affect the annual
outcomes.
The results of these exercises are presented below for each group of outcome variables.
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E.1.1 Agricultural Outcomes
Table E1: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Agricultural Outcomes
Agricultural Outcomes
Log Value Log Yield Log Price
(All Crops) (All Crops) (All Crops)
Degree Days (10 days) -0.00757∗∗∗ -0.00728∗∗∗ 0.000289
tL = 17, tH =∞ (0.00206) (0.00180) (0.000579)
Degree Days (10 days) 0.00394 -0.00437 -0.00831∗∗
tL = 0, tH = 17 (0.00369) (0.00475) (0.00395)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Crop × District, Crop × Year
and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 9,813 9,813 9,813
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence (up to 1,000km) as modelled
in Conley (1999) and serial correlation (1-year) as modelled in Newey and
West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Kernels
are selected to provide the most conservative standard errors, looped over all
distances between 10 and 2,000km and 1-7 years. Results are also robust to
using cluster robust standard errors at the State Level.
Figure 1: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Agricultural Outcomes
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E.1.2 Employment and Wage Outcomes
Table E2: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Construction
Degree Days (10 days) -0.000918 -0.00156 -0.000136 -0.000518
tL = 17, tH =∞ (0.000734) (0.00114) (0.00201) (0.00119)
Degree Days (10 days) 0.000373 0.00122 -0.000593 0.00118
tL = 0, tH = 17 (0.00258) (0.00336) (0.00357) (0.00222)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects District, Year and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 1,067 1068 1099 1035
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted
to reflect spatial dependence (up to 1,000km) as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation
(1-year) as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district
centroids. Kernels are selected to provide the most conservative standard errors, looped over all
distances between 10 and 2,000km and 1-7 years. Results are also robust to using cluster robust
standard errors at the State Level.
Figure 2: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Wages
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Table E3: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Construction Unemployed
Degree Days (10 days) -0.00264∗∗∗ 0.00163∗∗∗ 0.000796∗∗∗ 0.000107 0.000114
tL = 17, tH =∞ (0.000648) (0.000436) (0.000259) (0.000183) (0.000145)
Degree Days (10 days) -0.00435∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗ 0.00169∗∗ 0.0000111 -0.0000398
tL = 0, tH = 17 (0.00134) (0.000657) (0.000759) (0.000355) (0.000359)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects District, Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 1,105 1,105 1,105 1,105 1,105
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial
dependence (up to 1,000km) as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation (1-year) as modelled in Newey
and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Kernels are selected to provide the most
conservative standard errors, looped over all distances between 10 and 2,000km and 1-7 years. Results are also
robust to using cluster robust standard errors at the State Level.
Figure 3: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Employment
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E.1.3 Manufacturing Firms
Table E4: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Manufacturing Outcomes (Regulated)
Total Output Employment Employment Day Wage Day Wage
Contract Permanent Contract Permanent
Degree Days (10 days) -0.00250 -0.00396* 0.000167 0.00120 -0.00226***
tL = 17, tH =∞ (0.00162) (0.00204) (0.00110) (0.000992) (0.000621)
DD High × Flexibility 0.00429* 0.00556* 0.00222 -0.00331** 0.00221**
(0.00244) (0.00302) (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.000994)
Degree Days (10 days) -0.00546 -0.0114 -0.00611 -0.00663 -0.000463
tL = 0, tH = 17 (0.00730) (0.0134) (0.00514) (0.00540) (0.00308)
DD Low × Flexibility 0.00584 0.00990 0.00673 0.00810 0.00221
(0.0114) (0.0193) (0.00780) (0.00793) (0.00448)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 36,985 18,712 35,818 18,712 35,818
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are
adjusted to reflect spatial dependence (up to 1,800km) as modelled in Conley (1999) and
serial correlation (1-year) as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are
computed from district centroids. Kernels are selected to provide the most conservative
standard errors, looped over all distances between 10 and 2,000km and 1-7 years.
Table E5: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Manufacturing Outcomes (Regulated)
Output TFPR TFPR Items
Per Worker (CES) Produced
Degree Days (10 days) -0.00263* -0.00214** -0.00222** -0.00140**
tL = 17, tH =∞ (0.00159) (0.000886) (0.000919) (0.000693)
DD High × Flexibility 0.00346 0.00206* 0.00212* 0.00157
(0.0244) (0.0302) (0.0142) (0.0141)
Degree Days (10 days) -0.000404 -0.000242 -0.000244 -0.000107
tL = 0, tH = 17 (0.000712) (0.000388) (0.000402) (0.000296)
DD Low × Flexibility 0.000336 -0.0000634 -0.0000770 0.000251
(0.00107) (0.000596) (0.000615) (0.000444)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year
and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 36,985 33,445 33,464 36,985
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Stan-
dard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence (up to 1,800km) as
modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation (1-year) as modelled in
Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district
centroids. Kernels are selected to provide the most conservative standard
errors, looped over all distances between 10 and 2,000km and 1-7 years.
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Figure 4: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Manufacturing Outcomes (Regulated)
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Figure 5: The Effects of Daily Temperature on Manufacturing Outcomes (Regulated)
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E.2 Instrumental Variable Evidence
In this section I propose an Instrumental Variables strategy to support the basic identification
strategy. As discussed, and demonstrated, in the main results, there are a number of channels
through which temperature could affect manufacturing outcomes. Consequently, one cannot
use temperature as an instrument for agricultural yields or employment to look at the effects
of temperature on manufacturing through the labor reallocation channel, due to the clear
violation of the exclusion restriction. However, if one believes that the labor regulation
environment only moderates the effects of temperature through the labor reallocation channel
then one can instrument the interaction between agricultural yields or employment and the
labor regulation environment with the interaction of temperature and the labor regulation
environment. This allows the level effect of temperature to continue serving its role in
capturing the net effect of all remaining channels, while the interaction effect captures the
labor reallocation channel.
Table E6 explores the first stages for this instrument that could be used on two endoge-
nous regressors the share of workers who are agricultural laborers, and agricultural yields.
In both cases increases in temperature in flexible labor market environments are associated
with reductions in the share of employment and agricultural yields in flexible labor markets.
However, the F-statistic is larger when the endogenous regressor is the interaction between
labor market flexibility and agricultural yields. This may relate to the larger sample size
due to the complete coverage of years.
Table E6: First Stage Estimates
Ag. Worker Share log Yields
× Flexible × Flexible
Daily Average Temperature -16.225*** -0.350***
× Flexible (4.090) (0.055)
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year
and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 20,300 36,686
Angrist-Pischke F-Stat 15.73 40.43
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The
years of observation are 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007 for the agricultural laborer
instrument as these are the years in which data is available from the NSS.
Data for agricultural yields is available for all years. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
Focussing on the stronger first-stage relationship I estimate second-stage relationships
for manufacturing firm outcomes, using the interaction of log Yields and the flexibility of
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the labor regulation environment as the endogenous regressor.34 This gives an elasticity
interpretation to the instrumented regressor and the outcome variables which are in log
form. Consistent with the reduced form exercise in the main text I find that a reduction in
agricultural yields in more flexible labor regulation markets is associated with an increase
in output and contract workers, with a reduction in the wages of contract workers. In
addition, the number of permanent workers is unchanged and the average wage of permanent
workers increase. The estimated elasticity of substitution between contract and permanent
workers using these estimates is 0.29, smaller than the reduced form measure (0.53), but
still consistent with the premise that contract workers are complementary in the production
process (Table E7). As in the reduced form results I also find that a reduction in agricultural
yields in more flexible labor regulation markets is associated with increases in output per
worker and the number of items produced, as well as noisily estimated increases in TFP
(Table E8). Together these results provide suggestive evidence that the inflow of contract
workers allow firms to move down the average cost curve, by allowing permanent workers to
engage in more productive activities.
Table E7: Second Stage (log Yields × Flexible): The Effects of Daily Temperature on
Manufacturing Outcomes (Regulated)
log Output and Employment
Total Output Items Employment Employment
Produced (Contract) (Permanent)
Daily Average -0.0622 -0.0363∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ 0.0174
Temperature (◦C) (0.0424) (0.0164) (0.0398) (0.0327)
log Ag. Yields -0.438∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.806∗∗∗ -0.176
× Flexibility (0.195) (0.0802) (0.256) (0.161)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 36,686 36,686 18,421 35,521
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted
to reflect spatial dependence (up to 1,800km) as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation
(1-year) as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district
centroids. Kernels are selected to provide the most conservative standard errors, looped over all
distances between 10 and 2,000km and 1-7 years.
34Results are broadly robust to using the share of agricultural workers as the endogenous regressor pre-
sented in Tables E9 and E10.
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Table E8: Second Stage (log Yields × Flexible): The Effects of Daily Temperature on
Manufacturing Outcomes (Regulated)
log Wages and Productivity
Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Output TFPR TFPR
(Contract) (Permanent) Per Worker (CES)
Daily Average 0.0202 -0.0578∗∗ -0.0735∗∗ -0.0737∗∗ -0.0771∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0164) (0.0228) (0.0375) (0.0330) (0.0370)
log Ag. Yields 0.433∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.366∗∗ -0.277 -0.288
× Flexibility (0.175) (0.112) (0.183) (0.170) (0.188)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year
and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 18,421 35,521 36,686 33,137 33,163
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect
spatial dependence (up to 1,800km) as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation (1-year) as modelled
in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Kernels are selected to
provide the most conservative standard errors, looped over all distances between 10 and 2,000km and 1-7
years.
Table E9: Second Stage (Ag. Laborer Share × Flexible): The Effects of Daily Temperature
on Manufacturing Outcomes (Regulated)
log Output and Employment
Total Output Items Employment Employment
Produced (Contract) (Permanent)
Daily Average -0.0619∗ -0.0548∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ 0.0101
Temperature (◦C) (0.0365) (0.0258) (0.0784) (0.0804)
Ag. Laborer Share -0.877∗∗∗ -0.770∗∗∗ -1.760∗ -0.635
× Flexibility (0.311) (0.299) (0.900) (0.846)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 20,300 20,300 10,190 19,615
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted
to reflect spatial dependence (up to 1,800km) as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation
(1-year) as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district
centroids. Kernels are selected to provide the most conservative standard errors, looped over all
distances between 10 and 2,000km and 1-7 years.
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Table E10: Second Stage (Ag. Laborer Share × Flexible): The Effects of Daily Temperature
on Manufacturing Outcomes (Regulated)
log Wages and Productivity
Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Output TFPR TFPR
(Contract) (Permanent) Per Worker (CES)
Daily Average 0.0608∗∗∗ -0.0496∗∗ -0.0392 -0.0577 -0.0739
Temperature (◦C) (0.0184) (0.0211) (0.0482) (0.0560) (0.0631)
Ag. Laborer Share 0.847∗∗∗ -0.485∗ -0.377 -0.640 -0.750
× Flexibility (0.319) (0.259) (0.558) (0.473) (0.537)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year
and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 10,190 19,615 20,300 18,366 18,380
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are adjusted to
reflect spatial dependence (up to 1,800km) as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation (1-year)
as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Kernels
are selected to provide the most conservative standard errors, looped over all distances between 10 and
2,000km and 1-7 years.
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E.3 Alternative Definitions of the Labor Regulation Environment
In addition to the evidence in support of the identification strategy, I provide a series of
robustness tests in support for the main results.
Table E11: Alternative Measures of the Labor Regulation Environment – (Neutral and
Flexible Binary Variables)
log Output and Employment
Total Output Items Employment Employment
Produced (Contract) (Permanent)
Daily Average -0.0768∗ -0.0504∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ 0.00386
Temperature (◦C) (0.0449) (0.0162) (0.0472) (0.0319)
Temperature 0.0192 0.0205 0.00460 -0.00509
× Neutral (0.0590) (0.0276) (0.0661) (0.0468)
Temperature 0.0888 0.0380 0.125 0.0566
× Flexible (0.0647) (0.0264) (0.0785) (0.0414)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 36,985 36,985 18,712 35,818
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results
from regression the outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel
B presents the differential effects of temperature across labor regulation environments. Standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation
as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids.
Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
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Table E12: Alternative Measures of the Labor Regulation Environment – (Neutral and
Flexible Binary Variables)
log Wages and Productivity
Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Output TFPR TFPR
(Contract) (Permanent) per Worker (CES)
Daily Average 0.000705 -0.0731∗∗∗ -0.0755∗ -0.0807∗∗∗ -0.0844∗∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0263) (0.0169) (0.0415) (0.0250) (0.0260)
Temperature 0.0345 0.0247 0.00638 0.0231 0.0297
× Neutral (0.0337) (0.0234) (0.0525) (0.0265) (0.0266)
Temperature -0.0736∗ 0.0493∗ 0.0655 0.0459 0.0440
× Flexible (0.0383) (0.0278) (0.0625) (0.0333) (0.0336)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 18,712 35,818 36,985 33,440 33,464
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results from
regression the outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel B presents the
differential effects of temperature across labor regulation environments. Standard errors are adjusted to
reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and
West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering
standard errors at the State Level.
Table E13: Alternative Measures of the Labor Regulation Environment – (Flexible and
Neutral Combined Binary Measure)
log Output and Employment
Total Output Items Employment Employment
Produced (Contract) (Permanent)
Daily Average -0.00281 -0.0131 -0.0380 0.0429∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0351) (0.0114) (0.0336) (0.0232)
Temperature 0.0487 0.0217∗ 0.0705∗ 0.0299
× Flexibility (0.0324) (0.0130) (0.0383) (0.0203)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 36,985 36,985 18,712 35,818
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results
from regression the outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel
B presents the differential effects of temperature across labor regulation environments. Standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation
as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids.
Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
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Table E14: Alternative Measures of the Labor Regulation Environment – (Flexible and
Neutral Combined Binary Measure)
log Wages and Productivity
Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Output TFPR TFPR
(Contract) (Permanent) per Worker (CES)
Daily Average -0.0373∗∗ -0.0256∗∗ -0.0246 -0.0372∗∗ -0.0394∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0160) (0.0113) (0.0310) (0.0179) (0.0184)
Temperature -0.0371∗ 0.0280∗∗ 0.0354 0.0260 0.0254
× Flexibility (0.0191) (0.0141) (0.0311) (0.0167) (0.0169)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 18,712 35,818 36,985 33,440 33,464
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results from
regression the outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel B presents the
differential effects of temperature across labor regulation environments. Standard errors are adjusted to
reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and
West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering
standard errors at the State Level.
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E.4 Concerns Relating to the Endogenous Selection of Firms around
the Regulatory Threshold
One concern relates to the endogenous selection of firms around the regulatory threshold. To
mitigate these concerns I run the baseline specification dropping firms that have employment
within 20% of the thresholds.
Table E15: Baseline Specification - Dropping Firms with 20% of the Threshold
log Output and Employment
Total Output Items Employment Employment
Produced (Contract) (Permanent)
Daily Average -0.0933 -0.0458∗ -0.180∗∗ 0.0114
Temperature (◦C) (0.0572) (0.0247) (0.0717) (0.0386)
Temperature 0.190∗∗ 0.0486 0.254∗∗ 0.0462
× Flexibility (0.0931) (0.0391) (0.111) (0.0572)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 32,475 32,475 16,624 31,631
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results
from regression the outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel
B presents the differential effects of temperature across labor regulation environments. Standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation
as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids.
Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
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Table E16: Baseline Specification - Dropping Firms with 20% of the Threshold
log Wages and Productivity
Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Output TFPR TFPR
(Contract) (Permanent) per Worker (CES)
Daily Average 0.0307 -0.0777∗∗∗ -0.0865∗ -0.0940∗∗∗ -0.0981∗∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0355) (0.0237) (0.0523) (0.0293) (0.0310)
Temperature -0.112∗∗ 0.0972∗∗∗ 0.141 0.101∗∗ 0.106∗∗
× Flexibility (0.0526) (0.0370) (0.0869) (0.0431) (0.0445)
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Sector × District, Sector × Year, and State-Year Time Trends
Observations 16,624 31,631 32,475 29,489 29,510
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Panel A presents the results from
regression the outcome variable on the level of temperature and monsoon rainfall. Panel B presents the
differential effects of temperature across labor regulation environments. Standard errors are adjusted to
reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and
West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering
standard errors at the State Level.
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Table E17: Baseline Specification - Uniform Thresholds
log Output and Employment
Total Output Items Employment Employment
Produced (Contract) (Permanent)
Panel A: Above 100
UP dropped
Daily Average -0.169∗∗∗ -0.0467∗ -0.144∗∗ -0.0225
Temperature (◦C) (0.0582) (0.0240) (0.0692) (0.0429)
Temperature 0.215∗∗ 0.0555 0.172 0.102∗
× Flexibility (0.0937) (0.0365) (0.108) (0.0562)
Observations 35,102 35,102 17,716 33,980
Panel B: Above 120
UP dropped
Daily Average -0.114∗ -0.0373 -0.145∗∗ 0.00615
Temperature (◦C) (0.0656) (0.0278) (0.0708) (0.0492)
Temperature 0.183∗ 0.0362 0.197∗ 0.0478
× Flexibility (0.104) (0.0429) (0.111) (0.0693)
Observations 30,709 30,709 15,722 29,913
Panel C: Above 300
Daily Average -0.162∗ -0.0511 -0.253∗∗ -0.0566
Temperature (◦C) (0.0862) (0.0349) (0.101) (0.0623)
Temperature 0.308∗∗ 0.0790 0.412∗∗∗ 0.171∗
× Flexibility (0.128) (0.0532) (0.151) (0.0901)
Observations 14,264 14,264 8,144 14,048
Panel C: Above 360
Daily Average -0.160∗ -0.0510 -0.194∗ -0.0491
Temperature (◦C) (0.0892) (0.0374) (0.111) (0.0723)
Temperature 0.260∗∗ 0.0932∗ 0.279∗ 0.151
× Flexibility (0.131) (0.0558) (0.167) (0.106)
Observations 11,491 11,491 6,592 11,333
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. UP dropped = Uttar
Pradesh dropped. This is because the firm-size threshold for UP is 300. Standard errors are
adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as
modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances are computed from district centroids.
Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
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Table E18: Baseline Specification - Uniform Thresholds
log Wages and Productivity
Avg. Day Wage Avg. Day Wage Output TFPR TFPR
(Contract) (Permanent) per Worker (CES)
Panel A: Above 100
UP dropped
Daily Average 0.0325 -0.0786∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗ -0.0888∗∗∗ -0.0909∗∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0361) (0.0217) (0.0520) (0.0323) (0.0336)
Temperature -0.125∗∗ 0.0800∗∗ 0.140 0.0802∗ 0.0800∗
× Flexibility (0.0537) (0.0355) (0.0854) (0.0464) (0.0471)
Observations 17,716 33,980 35,102 31,925 31,947
Panel B: Above 120
UP dropped
Daily Average 0.0287 -0.0789∗∗∗ -0.0826 -0.0897∗∗∗ -0.0900∗∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0361) (0.0217) (0.0520) (0.0323) (0.0336)
Temperature -0.116∗∗ 0.0941∗∗ 0.117 0.0849∗ 0.0839∗
× Flexibility (0.0555) (0.0409) (0.0930) (0.0473) (0.0486)
Observations 15,722 29,913 30,709 28,039 28,059
Panel C: Above 300
Daily Average 0.0838∗ -0.0533∗ -0.0966 -0.0938∗∗∗ -0.0798∗∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0473) (0.0323) (0.0870) (0.0310) (0.0326)
Temperature -0.184∗∗∗ 0.0764 0.170 0.116∗∗ 0.0869∗
× Flexibility (0.0707) (0.0477) (0.121) (0.0491) (0.0517)
Observations 8,144 14,048 14,264 12,910 12,915
Panel D: Above 360
Daily Average 0.0934∗ -0.0611∗ -0.144 -0.0710∗∗ -0.0630∗
Temperature (◦C) (0.0562) (0.0362) (0.0885) (0.0348) (0.0357)
Temperature -0.178∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.204∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.0880
× Flexibility (0.0833) (0.0531) (0.124) (0.0517) (0.0543)
Observations 6,592 11,333 11,491 10,423 10,428
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. UP dropped = Uttar Pradesh dropped.
This is because the firm-size threshold for UP is 300. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence
as modelled in Conley (1999) and serial correlation as modelled in Newey and West (1987). District distances
are computed from district centroids. Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the State Level.
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F Adjustment Costs and the Potential Gains from Re-
allocation
This appendix provides an upper bound estimate of the gains associated with removing any
adjustment costs that impede the movement of casual workers into permanent manufacturing
positions. As discussed wage gaps could also be explained by skill differences and so do not
necessarily imply a misallocation of talent. Consequently, the lower bound associated with
this exercise is zero.
F.1 Modelling the Potential Gains from Reallocation
To provide some insight into the potential gains from reallocation I introduce some economic
structure to the data and explore quantitatively the impact of removing the distortion be-
tween casual manufacturing employment and permanent manufacturing employment – a
na¨ıve counterfactual in which it is assumed that all differences in wages are driven by mis-
allocation.
To assess the potential gains from reallocation I compare a hypothetical output level in
which labor is efficiently allocated across activities to observed output following a similar
approach taken in other firm-level and sector-level studies of misallocation (Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009, Vollrath, 2009, 2014, Gollin et al., 2014).
Assuming that each activity operates with a Cobb-Douglas production technology and
maximises profits, the wage distortion τ can be identified from the first-order condition,
wj = (1− α)ΛjL−αj
[
1
τ
]
(19)
where Λj = pjAj. The presence of adjustment costs, τ , will distort the amount of
labor used in activity j compared to the level used in the absence of the distortion. As
τ falls labor becomes relatively cheaper for activity j, and so the amount of labor that is
utilised rises. In this context misallocation arises as the marginal revenue product of labor
is not equalised across activities. To identify aggregate output two additional assumption
are required. First, I assume that labor is perfectly substitutable across activities, i.e., there
is no activity specific human capital. This implies that the total amount of labor in the
economy is simply L =
∑
j Lj.
35 The second assumption is that prices are exogenously
fixed, consistent with a small open economy in which all activities produce output that can
35This assumption implies that the gains from reallocation are an upper bound of the upper bound;
however, if one considers sector-specific human capital as a constraint to reallocation then relaxing this
constraint is part of the problem.
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be traded internationally.36 Under these assumptions observed output in the economy with
adjustment costs can be written,
Y =
(∑
j
Λ
1/α
j
[
1
τ
]1/α)α(∑
j
Lj
)1−α
which follows from using equation 19 for each activity to solve simultaneously for the
shares Lj/L, and then taking the sum of output across activities. In the presence of ad-
justment costs Y is below the output-maximising level. Consequently, one can estimate,
given the structure imposed above, how much output would rise under the counterfactual in
which these adjustment costs are removed. The counterfactual output after removing these
adjustment costs is written,
Y ∗ =
(∑
j
Λ
1/α
j
)α
L1−αj
With both observed output and counterfactual output levels, the gains from reallocation
can be written as,
G =
Y ∗
Y
=
(∑
j Λ
1/α
j
)α
(∑
j
Λ
1/α
j
τ1/α
)α
providing a measure of the gains in aggregate productivity from eliminating the adjust-
ment costs that impede the movement of labor across activities.
F.2 Estimating the Potential Gains from Reallocation
Given the model structure discussed above I estimate the gains from reallocation, Gˆ, for
each firm providing the average gains from reallocation, as well as the distribution of gains.
Under the na¨ıve assumption that the only difference in wages across activities is driven
by misallocation the average (observable) wage in the destination activity is,
E[wj] = E[wi]τ,
In log-linear terms, the distortion can therefore be estimated as the log-difference in
average wages across sectors,
36With endogenous prices the gains from reallocation would be smaller as an equivalent movement of
workers out of casual activities raises the marginal revenue product of labor by more than if prices are held
fixed.
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log τ = logE[wj]− logE[wi]
Taking this to the data, I estimate the following moment for each firm,
E[τ ] = exp(logE[wj]− logE[wi])
In addition, I use estimates of the average permanent manufacturing wage, E[wp], the
average casual manufacturing wage, E[wc], and the number of workers in each activity, Lj.
With these estimates, and an assigned value of α, I estimate output in each activity, Λj,
Λˆj =
wˆj τˆ
1− αLˆ
α
j
These values are then used to construct estimates for the observed level of output Yˆ ,
the counterfactual level of output Yˆ ∗, and, with these estimates, the estimated gains from
reallocation Gˆ.
Gˆ =
Yˆ ∗
Yˆ
=
(∑
j Λˆ
1/α
j
)α
(∑
j
Λˆ
1/α
j
τˆ1/α
)α
F.3 Counterfactual Estimates
In considering the gains from reallocation I construct a counterfactual that removes the total
wage gap across activities providing an upper bound on the size of adjustment costs. The
results of this exercise are presented in table F1.
Table F1: The Average Output Gains from Reallocation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Na¨ıve Gains 1.196 1.131 1.089 1.062 1.043
Labor Share ((1− α)) 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
Notes: These estimate provide an upper bound of the static gains
from reallocation under the assumption that the total wage gap be-
tween casual manufacturing workers and permanent manufacturing
workers are driven by adjustment costs. The lower bound estimate of
the static gains from reallocation are therefore zero.
I estimate that the removal of adjustment costs τj would result in an 8.9% increase
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in the manufacturing output of regulated firms hiring both casual and permanent workers
(α = 0.3), a non-trivial increase.
As emphasised, it is beyond the scope of this exercise to provide inferences about the
relative contribution that adjustment costs may play in explaining the wage gap between
casual and permanent manufacturing workers. Instead this exercise provides an upper bound
on the gains from reallocation, under the assumption that the total wage gap is driven by
adjustment costs. The lower bound is zero. Understanding the relative importance that
adjustment costs play in impeding the movement of workers out of casual employment and
into permanent positions remains an important area for future research.
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